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TO BE REAL: SEXUAL IDENTITY POLITICS IN
TORT LITIGATION*
ANNE BLOOM**
Tort litigation plays a role in constructing what we perceive to be
"real" about sexual identity. It does so by assuming that sexual
identity is naturally binary (male/female), even in cases which pose
a challenge to the credibility of that assumption. Thus, to be "real"
in tort litigation is to have a sexual identity which appears to be
naturally binary, even if you are not. Individuals who challenge this
conception may find it difficult to obtain compensation for their
injuries or, worse, may not be permitted to sue at all. These
practices have important political effects. The most important of
these is that tort litigation makes binary sexual difference appear
more natural than it is. Since this outcome is at odds with lived
experience, this Article argues that tort litigation should take a more
pragmatic approach to sexual identity issues, by making space for
competing conceptions of sexual identity.
"I wish just once they'd look at me and see me .... Just really
see me."
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INTRODUCTION
This Article is about the difficulty of being real about sexual
identity in tort litigation. It explores the challenges of being real in a
culture that demands certain physical indicia of "realness" for
purposes of sexual identity, and it argues that law is not neutral in
responding to these demands. More radically, this Article claims that
tort litigation plays an important role in constructing what we
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perceive to be "real" about sexual identity, by enforcing particular
understandings about what sexual identity should look like.2
The title is also a nod to Paris is Burning, Jennie Livingston's
documentary of the Harlem drag circuit of the 1980s, which features
Cheryl Lynn's 1979 disco hit, Got to Be Real, as part of the
soundtrack.3 In the drag balls shown in the film, contestants compete
to be the most "real" in a variety of categories, ranging from "butch
queen" and "school boy" to "military," "preppie," and "executive
realness."'4 "Realness" is judged by how well the contestant is able to
"pass" as authentically belonging to the particular category.'
Although the contestants are judged on how "real" they look,
there are no illusions at the drag balls. Everyone knows that they are
watching a performance and that "realness" in this context
necessarily involves a certain amount of artificiality. As one of the
ball contestants puts it, everyone knows that "you're not really an
executive but you're looking like one."6 At the same time, there is
also an understanding that, at least in some instances, the
performances correspond with the contestants' own understandings
of their identities.7 Put differently, drag balls acknowledge that
"realness" is a contested term.8
2. My use of the word "real" to convey different meanings in this paragraph is
deliberate, as it is throughout the Article. This Article argues that the cultural standards
for "realness" in sexual identity are at odds with real-life lived experiences with sexual
identity. For example, for many individuals, there is a divide (and sometimes a conflict)
between one's internal sense of sexual identity and the body's external indicators of
"realness," which sometimes fail to live up to cultural expectations about what sexual
identity should look like. To indicate the distinction between external expectations of
"realness" and real-life experiences with sexual identity, I use quotations around
references to cultural expectations about what it means to be "real."
3. DAVID FOSTER, DAVID PAICH & CHERYL LYNN, Got to Be Real (Columbia
Music 1978), in PARIS IS BURNING (Prestige Films 1990).
4. PARIS Is BURNING, supra note 3. In some instances, the contestants are
performing a particular expression of sexual identity; in others, the contestants are
attempting to convince the audience that they are members of a particular social class, like
a business executive or a member of the military. Id.
5. See id. Passing is a strategy for appearing to belong to an identity category in a
way that seems "real" but may not be. See generally Randall Kennedy, Racial Passing, 62
OHIO ST. L.J. 1145 (2001) (describing passing as a "deception").
6. PARIS Is BURNING, supra note 3 (quoting drag ball contestant Dorian Corey).
7. See id. Many contestants, for example, say that they feel that they could belong to
the category that they purport to represent in "real-life," if society would simply give them
the opportunity. See id. (referring to comments by drag ball contestant Dorian Corey).
8. See Esther Newton, Selection from MOTHER CAMP, in THE TRANSGENDER
STUDIES READER 121, 124 (Susan Stryker & Stephen Whittle eds., 2006). Contestants
who compete in categories emphasizing femininity, for example, may feel there is nothing
"mannish" about them, even though society views them as "males." See PARIS IS
BURNING, supra note 3 ("I don't feel that there's anything mannish about me, except
2010]
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Ultimately, however, the winners at the drag balls are those who
are able to pass more successfully than others in their category.9 In
other words, even though "realness" is understood as a contested
term, cultural expectations of "realness" still matter for purposes of
winning. When a contestant competes in a category, an announcer
asks the audience, "Does she look like a real woman?"'" Awards are
distributed on the basis of how well contestants are able to pass in
terms of external criteria for "realness," regardless of how the
contestants feel inside."
Something similar happens in tort litigation. In tort cases,
litigants do not compete to be the most "real," but tort plaintiffs
routinely attempt to successfully convince a judge or a jury of the
"realness" of their injuries. 2 And when the "realness" of a plaintiff's
injury is in doubt, it will be more difficult for her to recover
compensation. Moreover, as in the drag balls, the "realness" of an
individual's sexual identity is also often at issue in tort litigation.13
Like judges at drag balls, judges and juries in tort litigation look
for evidence that litigants are able to successfully "pass" as a member
of the sexual identity category that they purport to represent. And, as
with their assessment of a plaintiff's injury, if the "realness" of a
litigant's sexual identity is in doubt, it will be more difficult for the
plaintiff to recover compensation for her injuries.14 In other words, it
maybe what I might have between me down there, which is my little personal thing."
(quoting drag queen Venus Xtravaganza)). For these contestants, drag balls present an
opportunity to express an identity that more closely corresponds to how they feel inside.
See Newton, supra at 124 (discussing the significance of drag generally). For others, drag
balls may be an opportunity to compete in categories with which the contestants may not
identify, but which they, nevertheless, perform quite successfully. Id. ("At the most
complex, [drag] is a double inversion that says 'appearance is an illusion.' ").
9. For a general description of how drag balls work, see Guy Trebay, Paris is Still
Burning: Legends of the Ball, VILLAGE VOICE, Jan. 18, 2000, at 29. Further discussion is
available in Leslie Pearlman, Transsexualism as Metaphor: The Collision of Sex and
Gender, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 835, 835 n.2 (1995).
10. PARIS Is BURNING, supra note 3.
11. Id.
12. 1 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 1, at 1 (2000) ("Much of formal tort law
is an attempt to define what counts as a legal wrong in particular settings."). Nelson P.
Miller, The Attributes of Care and Carelessness: A Proposed Negligence Jury Instruction,
39 NEW ENG. L. REV. 795, 798-99 (2005) ("[Tort law] comes into play only when a real
injury has occurred under real circumstances.").
13. As will be discussed further in this Article, sometimes one's sexual identity is an
element of a tort, and sometimes it is a factor that the judge and jury consciously, or
unconsciously, consider. See infra Part II.B.
14. See, e.g., Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. App. 1999) (concluding the
plaintiff could not bring wrongful death claim on behalf of her deceased husband because
she was not a "real" woman), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 872 (2000); see also Brief for Harry
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is difficult to qualify as a viable legal subject in tort litigation, unless
your sexual identity appears to be "real.""5
"Realness" in tort litigation, however, is judged by a different set
of criteria than "realness" in the drag balls. In the drag balls, the
"realness" of the contestants' sexual identities is assessed in terms of
how well they are able to "pass" as the sexual identity they purport to
represent.6 It does not matter if the successful performance of
"realness" is achieved through artifice.17 In tort litigation, however,
''realness" requires evidence that your sexual identity is "natural,"
not faked. 8
"Natural," however, does not have a stable meaning in tort
litigation. Sometimes it means that your body should display the
biological indicators of the sexual identity that you were born with. 9
When this is the case, "natural" means "unaltered." Other times,
artificial alterations, such as breast implants and other types of faking,
Benjamin Int'l Gender Dysphoria Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant
at 2, Brandon v. County of Richardson, 624 N.W.2d 604 (Neb. 2001) (No. S-00-0022)
("[T]he trial court's finding of contributory negligence may be based on the disturbing
misconception that Brandon was somehow at fault simply for existing and interacting with
others as a transgender person-i.e., for presenting himself as male rather than female.").
15. In this respect, the Article follows in the footsteps of Martha Chamallas's
pathbreaking work on the impact of gender ideology on tort law. See Martha Chamallas &
Linda K. Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law of Fright: A History, 88 MICH. L. REV.
814, 815 (1990). It also draws heavily on the insights of queer legal theory. See Katherine
M. Franke, Putting Sex to Work, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 1139, 1141 (1998); Janet E. Halley,
Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Argument from
Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503, 506 (1994).
16. See PARIS Is BURNING, supra note 3; see also Trebay, supra note 9 (discussing the
various performance categories within balls and the way contestants match their attire and
movements to each theme).
17. As a result, drag is sometimes described as a "denaturalizing" performance.
JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER: ON THE DISCURSIVE LIMITS OF SEX 128 (1993)
[hereinafter BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER]. Drag is "denaturalizing" because the
performance exposes that what appears "natural" (e.g., biological sex) is, in fact, artificial.
Id.
18. See Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 231 (noting that the plaintiff was required to provide
evidence that she was naturally a woman). "Natural" is in quotes here to emphasize the
disconnect between what real bodies experience as natural and cultural expectations about
what bodies should look like naturally. The distinction matters because of how law treats
some artificial body parts, like implants to replace a body part lost to disease, as "natural,"
even when they are clearly artificial. Conversely, some natural body parts, like cleft
palates, are not considered "natural" even when the condition has existed since birth. In
tort litigation, for example, plaintiffs who are perceived as replacing "natural" parts tend
to receive greater compensation than those who are perceived as interfering with nature.
See Susan Dennehy, Mirror, Mirror, on the Wall, TRIAL, Aug. 2006, at 54, 54 (explaining
that juries penalize litigants who have altered or enhanced a natural feature of their
bodies).
19. See Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 231.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
are permitted, if they are judged to be done for purposes of
reconstructing a natural body part or creating body parts that tort
litigation assumes should have existed naturally. ° When this is the
case, "natural" means "normal," as defined by a set of cultural
criteria which tort litigation helps to define.
"Realness" in tort litigation also requires that sexual identities be
conveyed in immutable, binary terms. A prospective litigant should
be either a male or a female.2' It is not permissible to be both (or
neither) and once a body is designated, it is ordinarily not permissible
to change back and forth.2 Thus, to be "real" in tort litigation is to be
naturally, that is, biologically, male or female, and to remain fixed in
that identity, absent extraordinary circumstances.23 Individuals who
mess with nature may find it difficult to obtain compensation for their
injuries or, worse, not be permitted to sue at all.24
This is so despite the fact that tort litigation often exposes how
much artificial help people need to successfully pass as male or
female. Breast implants,25 vaginoplasty,26 penile implants,27 testicular
implants,28 erectile dysfunction medication, 29 electrolysis,30 and weight
20. See, e.g., Artiglio v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 589, 592
(Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (suggesting that breast implant recipients who were replacing a
natural breast might be able to recover under a theory of strict liability but those who
underwent implantation for strictly cosmetic purposes could not); see also Dennehy, supra
note 18, at 54 (describing how juries punish plaintiffs "who chose to tamper with nature").
21. See, e.g., MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL AND GENERAL COURT OF COLONIAL
VIRGINIA 194-95 (H.R. McIlwaine ed., Va. State Library 2d ed. 1979) (1629) (reporting
the case of Thomas/Thomasine Hall and inquiring into whether the defendant was a male
or a female) [hereinafter VIRGINIA COLONIAL MINUTES]; see also infra Part III
(discussing the requirement that individuals choose either to be male or female).
22. Cf Dean Spade, Resisting Medicine, Re/Modeling Gender, 18 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 15, 15-18, 23-28 (2003) (detailing the difficulties that accompany legally
changing one's gender). But see VIRGINIA COLONIAL MINUTES, supra note 21, at 194-95
(ordering the defendant to dress as both a man and a woman).
23. See Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 231; see also infra Part II (discussing the effect on
litigation when people who have altered their physical appearance sue under tort law).
24. See Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 231; see also infra Part II (discussing the barriers to tort
litigation and damage awards).
25. See Anne Bloom, Rupture, Leakage, and Reconstruction: The Body as a Site for
the Enforcement and Reproduction of Sex-based Legal Norms in the Breast Implant
Controversy, COLUM. J. GENDER & L., No. 2, at 85, 89 (2005) (describing the breast
implant litigation).
26. See Browning v. Burt, 613 N.E.2d 993, 993-94 (Ohio 1993) (medical malpractice
claim involving vaginoplasty); Just v. Misericordia Hosp., 213 N.W.2d 369, 371 (Wis. 1974)
(same).
27. See In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 1996 FED App. 0049P, T1 3 (6th Cir.), 75 F.3d 1069,
1074 (class action involving allegedly defective penile implants).




loss drugs31 (to help bodies look more "female") are just a few of the
many techniques for the construction or amplification of binary
sexual identity that have become the subject of tort litigation. When
these products and treatments fail, the ensuing litigation reveals the
extent to which sexual identity is not completely natural.
Even in the absence of faking, tort litigation reveals that many
bodies naturally possess attributes that defy a rigid, binary
classification. Men with breasts, women with facial hair, women
without breasts, and intersex individuals, to give just a few examples,
evidence the incredible complexity of natural, sexual difference in the
real world. When an individual's body lacks one or more of the
expected markers of binary sexual differentiation, the individual may
undergo surgery or other treatments in an attempt to artificially
construct the expected indicators of a binary sexual identity.
Not all of the treatments are successful. Sex assignment surgeries
fail,32 doctors commit malpractice,33 sexual identity enhancing drugs
cause unexpected side effects,34 and, sometimes, the treatment is
simply not very convincing.35 When tort litigation is filed, it exposes
both the failure of the treatments and the underlying gap between
real bodies and the expectation of binary sexual difference.
Tort litigation nevertheless demands that we act as if sexual
identity is wholly natural and naturally binary. We can see this most
clearly in cases involving post-operative transsexuals, who may be
denied standing to sue in their post-operative sexual identity.36 But it
29. See Keller v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 105650/07, 2008 WL 351001, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Feb. 8, 2008) (malpractice action involving the erectile dysfunction drug Viagra).
30. See Lenhart v. Naccarato, No. 2164, 1990 WL 371771, at *1 (Pa. Ct. Com. P. Sept.
27, 1990) (electrolysis).
31. See In re Diet Drug Prods. Liab. Litig., 220 F. Supp. 2d 414, 414 (E.D. Pa. 2002)
(weight loss drug litigation).
32. See, e.g., JOHN COLAPINTO, As NATURE MADE HIM: THE BOY WHO WAS
RAISED AS A GIRL, at xiv (2000) (reporting on the failed attempt to reassign David
Reimer as a female).
33. See, e.g., Weinberg v. Geary, 686 N.E.2d 1298,1298 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
34. See, e.g., Keller, 2008 WL 351001, at *1 (alleging in a malpractice action that the
erectile dysfunction drug Viagra caused vision loss).
35. See, e.g., Toppino v. Herhahn, 673 P.2d 1297, 1299 (N.M. 1983) (malpractice claim
for improperly sized breast implants).
36. See, e.g., Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. App. 1999), cert. denied, 531
U.S. 872 (2000). The term "transsexual" has taken on different meanings in different
discourses. See Noa Ben-Asher, The Necessity of Sex Change: A Struggle for Intersex and
Transsex Liberties, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 51, 51 n.1 (2006). At one time, the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders ("DSM") used the term
"transsexualism" to refer to a desire to live in a different sex. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 261-62 (3d ed. 1980).
The most recent edition uses the same language but now labels the category "Gender
20 1
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is also true in products liability lawsuits, where the expectation that
sexual identity is, or should be, naturally binary comes into play in
more subtle ways.37 The most obvious example of this is in the
differential treatment of plaintiffs who sue after undergoing surgery
to replace a natural body part (that was lost, for example, during a
mastectomy) and those who undergo surgery for what many courts
call "purely cosmetic" purposes (i.e., amplification of one's "natural"
sexual identity).38 In cases like these, tort litigation exposes the
artificiality of binary sexual identity but also attempts to re-naturalize
it, through damage awards and other practices which make it more
difficult for litigants whose "realness" is questioned to bring a
successful claim.
39
Conversely, tort law protects doctors who artificially construct
the bodily markers of binary sexual identity on intersex infants.4 °
Thus, post-operative transsexuals are less "real" under the law after
their surgeries while intersex infants become more "real" after
undergoing similar treatments. Together, the outcomes send a
message that "real" sexual identity is, or should be, binary and, where
possible, determined on the basis of natural bodily markers observed
at birth.
One important political effect of this is that individuals who
cannot comply with these demands are excluded from obtaining the
benefits that tort litigation provides. A somewhat more insidious
political effect involves the impact of the cases on our political
consciousness: tort litigation helps make binary sexual difference
Identity Disorder." AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS 576-77 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV]; Ben-Asher, supra,
at 51 n.1. I use "transsexual" here to refer broadly to individuals who identify with a sexual
identity that is different from a sexual identity with which they have been designated in
the past, while recognizing that the term is undergoing active re-signification.
37. See Dennehy, supra note 18, at 54; see also infra Part I.B (discussing the
consequences jurors impose against tort litigants who received breast implants for
cosmetic reasons).
38. See Dennehy, supra note 18, at 54.
39. See Bloom, supra note 25, at 110-11.
40. See infra Part III.B.2; see also Julie A. Greenberg, Legal Aspects of Gender
Assignment, 13 ENDOCRINOLOGIST 277, 285 (2003) [hereinafter Greenberg, Legal Aspects
of Gender Assignment] ("No legal liability can result from providing parents with full
information and allowing them to make an informed decision."). Experts estimate that
between one and four percent of the population is born intersex. See, e.g., ANNE FAUSTO-
STERLING, SEXING THE BODY: GENDER POLITICS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF
SEXUALITY 51 (2000) (1.7% of the population); Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and
Female: Intersexuality and the Collision Between Law and Biology, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 265,




appear more natural than it is. This is because, when a court decides a
case, it necessarily adopts some version of the litigants' stories about
the underlying realities which gave rise to the lawsuit and provides
legal support for a particular political outcome. Put differently, legal
rulings provide both legitimacy and authority for what "realness"
means outside the courthouse doors. In the context of sexual identity,
this means that tort litigation helps shape our understandings of what
is culturally and politically permissible.
Tort litigation is not alone, of course, in playing this role. Medical
practices, scientific beliefs, and religious values also play important
parts in constructing what we believe to be "real" about sexual
identity. Because tort litigation is uniquely concerned with bodily
injury, however, it plays a particularly important role as both a
translator of different views about sexual identity and an enforcer of
the normative boundaries that they create.
This Article argues that courts need to be more real about the
role of tort litigation in sexual identity politics. It claims that to do so
courts must first become more attentive to the ways in which law
influences how non-legal actors view the world. Drawing on the
pragmatic realism of Oliver Wendell Holmes,41 this Article also
argues that tort litigation can become more real about sexual identity
by paying greater attention to real-life experiences with sexual
identity. "Realness" in this framework is assessed not by reference to
a set of normative principles about what sexual identity should be but,
rather, by reference to ongoing real-life lived experiences with sexual
identity. Following Holmes and the realist tradition, this approach
does not eschew categories of sexual identity completely but
recognizes them as contingent hypotheses that must undergo
continuous evaluation and reworking in light of changing
understandings of how sexual identity is experienced.42
The remainder of this Article is divided into four parts. Part I
surveys a variety of tort cases to show how tort litigation can raise
questions about the "realness" of sexual identity. In these cases,
courts confront cultural, medical, and scientific practices that expose
the artificiality, or socially constructed aspects, of sexual identity. The
cases also expose courts to competing narratives of "realness" in
41. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 465-66
(1897); see also Susan Haack, On Legal Pragmatism: Where Does "the Path of the Law"
Lead Us?, 50 AM. J. JURIS. 71, 71 (2005) (describing Holmes's relationship to
pragmatism).
42. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Boston, Little Brown
1881) ("The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.").
2010]
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sexual identity, including narratives which suggest a conflict between
the experience of sexual identity and cultural expectations about what
sexual identity should look like.
Part II argues that when faced with this evidence in tort
litigation, courts do not take a neutral approach toward considering
and weighing the credibility of competing narratives. Instead, courts
privilege narratives which treat sexual identity as if it were naturally
binary, even as the cases in front of them suggest the opposite. In this
respect, courts treat sexual identity quite differently than gender
identity.43  While gender identity is understood as a cultural
phenomenon, which may have elements of artificial construction,
you've "got to be real," (i.e., naturally binary), when it comes to
sexual identity.
Part III argues that the privileging of one narrative of sexual
identity above others in tort litigation has political implications that
go well beyond the denial of the benefits of tort litigation to particular
classes of people. The most important of these political effects is the
impact of the litigation on our political consciousness and our
perceptions of what is possible. When legal narratives, such as those
produced in tort litigation, echo those that are expressed outside the
courtroom, the law provides political and cultural legitimacy for
dominant sexual identity narratives and delegitimizes others.
Using insights from Holmes and other pragmatic realists, Part IV
argues that tort litigation can and should be more responsive to
competing narratives about sexual identity, including narratives which
recognize that sexual identity is, at least in part, socially constructed.'
Special attention is paid to the role of medical and scientific opinion
in tort cases and the highly influential role that experts play in
constructing cultural expectations about the bodily indicators of
sexual identity. This Article maintains that, rather than privileging
43. See Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The
Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1995) (describing how
courts treat sex and gender differently); see also Greenberg, Defining Male and Female,
supra note 40, at 292-93 (discussing how courts attempt to determine "sex").
44. See generally JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE (1990) [hereinafter BUTLER,
GENDER TROUBLE] (discussing the distinction between sex and gender and the theories
behind what gender is and how it is formed). As Butler notes, it is of questionable utility
to distinguish between "sex" and "gender." Id. at 7. In Butler's words, "perhaps this
construct called 'sex' is as culturally constructed as gender; indeed, perhaps it was always
already gender, with the consequence that the distinction between sex and gender turns
out to be no distinction at all." Id. In this Article, I use "sex" to emphasize the role of the
body in the social construction of sexual identity. I do not mean to suggest a clear
delineation between "sex" and "gender."
[Vol. 88
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these expert views, courts should accord them no greater or lesser
weight than other cultural narratives on sexual identity.
More specifically, this Article calls for practices in tort litigation
which emphasize the importance of lived experience in evaluating
questions that relate to sexual identity. With this type of approach,
legal understandings of sexual identity would be inferred from
observations and reflection upon diverse human experience, rather
than deduced from propositions about what sexual identity should
look like. In short, this Article calls for a "bottom-up," rather than
"top-down" approach to sexual identity, which is constantly
recalibrating in response to the changing realities of everyday human
experience.
I. TORT LITIGATION RAISES QUESTIONS ABOUT THE "REALNESS"
OF SEXUAL IDENTITY
Snips and snails, and puppy-dogs' tails,
That's what little boys are made of.
Sugar and spice, and everything nice,
That's what little girls are made of.45
This well-known rhyme, a staple of children's literature in the
United States, provides poetic expression to some of our most deeply
held cultural beliefs about sexual difference. First published in 1820,
the rhyme continues to have cultural resonance. In the contemporary
cartoon The Powerpuff Girls, for example, the fictional Professor
Utonium tries to create the "perfect little girl" using a mixture of
"sugar, spice, and everything nice."46
No one believes that little girls are really made of "sugar and
spice," of course. Some people might even object to a
characterization of sexual difference along these lines. Still, the rhyme
remains popular because it effectively articulates two important
cultural assumptions: boys and girls are "made" differently and these
differences divide along binary lines. This emphasis on how boys and
45. ROBERT SOUTHEY, WHAT FOLKS ARE MADE OF (1820), reprinted in MOTHER
GOOSE: FROM NURSERY TO LITERATURE 175-76 (Gloria T. Delamar ed., McFarland
1987).
46. See The Powerpuff Girls: Insect Inside / Powerpuff Bluff (Cartoon Network
television broadcast Nov. 25, 1998). For further information on The Powerpuff Girls
television show, see The Powerpuff Girls: Full Episodes and Free Games from the TV
Show, http://www.cartoonnetwork.com/tv-shows/ppg/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2010).
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girls are "made" also tracks closely with conventional understandings
about the nature of binary sexual identity as biologically based.
Courts share these assumptions. In discrimination law, for
example, the perceived "realness" of sexual difference excuses some
types of discriminatory conduct.47 Differential treatment based on
cultural assumptions about "gender," on the other hand, is routinely
struck down.48
Sex-based distinctions are more "real," these cases suggest,
because they rest on biology.49 "Gender" distinctions, in contrast, are
less "real" because they are products of historically contingent
cultural beliefs.50 In other words, most legal decisions assume that
sexual identity is both "naturally" binary and immutable." A number
of contemporary theorists, however, contest these assumptions and
argue that sex and sexual identity are inextricably linked with
culture. 2 If this is true, then sexual identity is not rooted in biology
and "fixed" at birth but, rather, highly mutable and, on occasion,
47. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 469
(1981) (holding that biological differences between boys and girls provided an adequate
justification for sex-based differences in California's statutory rape law); see also Nguyen
v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001) (upholding different rules for attainment of citizenship by
children born abroad out of wedlock, depending on whether the mother or the father was
the American, on the grounds that "basic biological differences" between men and women
affect parent-child relationships in meaningful ways); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 79
(1981) (upholding sex-based differences in federal draft law on grounds that males and
females are "not similarly situated" for combat (quoting Michael M., 450 U.S. at 469));
Tracy E. Higgins, "By Reason of Their Sex": Feminist Theory, Postmodernism, and Justice,
80 CORNELL L. REV. 1536, 1550-54 (1995) (arguing that assumptions about biological
difference continue to guide much legal decision-making, particularly in sex discrimination
jurisprudence).
48. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976) (striking down sex-based beer
consumption law on the ground that it relied upon impermissible stereotypes about
differences in male and female behavior); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel., 511 U.S. 127, 152
(1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[O]ur case law does reveal a strong
presumption that gender classifications are invalid.").
49. See, e.g., Michael M., 450 U.S. at 469 (emphasizing biological differences between
boys and girls); see also Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 73 (emphasizing biological differences
between men and women); Higgins, supra note 47, at 1550-54 (arguing that assumptions
about biological difference continue to guide much legal decision-making, particularly in
sex discrimination jurisprudence).
50. See generally Franke, supra note 43 (describing the difference between gender-
based and sex-based characteristics).
51. See id. at 9 (explaining common assumptions about sex-based and gender-based
distinctions).
52. See, e.g., BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 44, at 7 (arguing that there is
no distinction between sex and gender); see also Halley, supra note 15, at 504 ("[T]he
postmodern critique of liberal explanations of the self posits that culture, not human
nature, gives humans their sexual orientations.").
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constructed through artificial means.53 Many tort cases provide
support for this alternative understanding about the mutability and
nature of sexual identity.
One of the earliest American cases to directly address questions
about sexual identity is the case of ThomaslThomasine Hall, which
came before the courts of Virginia in 1629."4 The precise legal basis
for the proceeding is unclear. There is nothing in the record to
indicate the cause of action. A review of the facts, however, suggests
that the Hall case was very likely a tort case and that the particular
cause of action under consideration was the tort of wrongful
seduction.55
According to court records, Hall was a servant who had worked
for a number of people in the area, including a Mr. Richard Bennets
and Mr. John Tyos 6 The legal proceedings seem to have been
initiated after a member of the Tyos household reported that Hall
"did ly with a maid of Mr. Richard Bennets called great Besse." 57
Although these facts hint at some sort of assault, Hall does not
appear to have been charged with a crime, and there is no evidence of
an inquiry into whether Besse was, in fact, assaulted.58 Instead, the
entire focus of the proceeding was on determining whether Hall had
committed some sort of deception in the presentation of his sexual
identity with other servants.59
This emphasis on deception and, in particular, on the possibility
of a sexual deception involving a servant is consistent with a judicial
inquiry into whether Hall's actions gave rise to what was then the tort
of seduction.' Although defined somewhat differently today (in those
jurisdictions where the tort still exists), at the time, the tort of
53. BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 44, at 9; see also NANCY LEVIT, THE
GENDER LINE 30 (1998) ("Biological differences cannot be separated from the cultural
process of assigning meaning to differences.").
54. VIRGINIA COLONIAL MINUTES, supra note 21, at 194-95.
55. See 2 DOBBS, supra note 12, § 443, at 1252. Historically, common law permitted a
father to bring a claim for seduction for both medical expenses and the loss of his
daughter's services. Id. The precise elements of the claim are unclear but the claim seems
to have focused primarily on the misrepresentation involved in obtaining sexual consent.
See id. at 1252 n.27.
56. VIRGINIA COLONIAL MINUTES, supra note 21, at 194-95.
57. Id. at 194.
58. Id. at 195; see also Laurel Thatcher Ulrich, Cloth, Clothing and Early American
Social History, 18 DRESS 39, 45 (1991) (noting that Hall does not appear to have been
charged with a crime).
59. VIRGINIA COLONIAL MINUTES, supra note 21, at 195.
60. See generally Jane E. Larson, "Women Understand So Little, They Call My Good
Nature 'Deceit' ": A Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 382-83
(1993) (describing the origins of the action for seduction).
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seduction typically involved some sort of deception and the loss of
services.61 In an ordinary case, a father would bring a case on behalf
of his daughter.62 In the absence of a father, however, the tort of
seduction could be brought by a guardian who took the father's place
in terms of lost services.
63
In the Hall case, the court record indicates that the case was
brought to the court's attention by men responding to a report from
the Tyos household, for whom Hall had worked as a servant.'
Although an allegation involving "great Besse" would have been
more properly brought by her own employer (Mr. Richard Bennets),
the employers likely shared the same concerns about Hall.65
Besse might also have brought the case in her own capacity in the
form of a libel claim. Although contemporary libel claims focus
primarily on harm to reputation, this was not always the case.66 At the
time of the Hall case, the tort of libel also seems to have included
claims for misrepresentation, particularly in the context of sex.67
Under this theory, Besse would have been able to pursue a tort claim
on her own, in the form of libel.
61. Id. at 383. This was because the tort emerged from property law as a means of
compensating fathers for the lost services of their daughters after a seduction occurred. Id.
at 382-83. In this respect, the tort of seduction, in its early form, operated in much the
same way that masters could sue for injuries to their servants. Id. at 382. Today,
individuals may bring the tort of seduction in their own right. See 2 DOBBS, supra note 12,
§ 443, at 1252. Although the tort has been specifically abolished in a few jurisdictions, it is
still recognized in others. Compare M.N. v. D.S. 616 N.W.2d 284, 286 (Minn. Ct. App.
2000) ("The Minnesota legislature has abolished the civil actions for seduction .... ") with
Breece v. Jett, 556 S.W.2d 696, 708 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (maintaining an action for
seduction).
62. Larson, supra note 60, at 383.
63. Id. at 383 n.28 (citing M.B.W. Sinclair, Seduction and the Myth of the Ideal
Woman, 5 LAW & INEQ. 33, 36-37, 41-45 (1987)).
64. VIRGINIA COLONIAL RECORDS, supra note 21, at 195.
65. As her employer in what was likely an arrangement of indentured servitude,
Bennets would have effectively served as Besse's guardian. Under these circumstances, it
would have been appropriate for him to bring the tort of seduction on Besse's behalf. See
generally Larson, supra note 60, at 382-83 (describing the circumstances under which an
action for seduction was brought).
66. See Kif Augustine-Adams, Defamed Women: Salve Deus Rex Judaeorum, 22
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 207, 209 (1999) (describing defamation claims in the early modern
era as sometimes revolving around questions of sexual honesty). In any event, reputation
does not appear to have been directly at issue in the Hall case. See VIRGINIA COLONIAL
RECORDS, supra note 21, at 195.
67. For an example of a libel case, see Patricia Crawford & Sara Mendelson, Sexual
Identities in Early Modern England: The Marriage of Two Women in 1680, 7 GENDER &
HIST. 362, 364-65 (1995), discussing the case of Arabella Hunt, who sought to annul her
marriage to James Howard, on the ground that James Howard was actually Amy Poulter,
who was already legally married to someone else. The gist of Hunt's complaint was that
her husband had misrepresented both his prior marital status and his sexual identity. Id.
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Whether the case sounded in seduction, libel, or some other legal
theory, the main focus of the Hall proceeding was on the more
fundamental question of whether Hall was a man or a woman.6
According to members of the community, Hall's sexual identity was
unclear.69 Hall testified that she was christened Thomasine (a
"female" name) v° Hall presented herself in public, however, as both a
man and a woman, depending on the circumstances.7
Upon physical examination, some experts initially declared Hall
a man.72 But Hall urged a second exam and claimed that, in addition
to an apparent penis, she also had "a peece of an hole."73 In response,
the court ordered a second physical exam. 4 Following this exam, the
court concluded that Hall was both "a man and a woeman. 7 5
The court then devised an interesting remedy. After concluding
that Hall was both male and female, the court ordered Hall to dress in
a fashion that conveyed this dual status.76 Specifically, Hall was
ordered to dress "in mans apparell, only his head to bee attired in a
Coyfe and Croscloth with an Apron before him., 7
Hall appears to be one of the first known cases involving a
litigant who challenged the assumption that sexual identity divides
naturally along binary lines. 78 It is particularly interesting because the
68. VIRGINIA COLONIAL RECORDS, supra note 21, at 194. This question would have
been key to deciding the case if it had been brought as either a seduction or a libel claim
(or both). If Hall was "really" a man and presented himself as a woman, as the facts seem
to suggest, then the plaintiffs would have been able to establish the misrepresentation
element of their claim(s). See Larson, supra note 60, at 382-83 (describing the tort of
seduction as "an act of intentional, harmful misrepresentation"); see also SELECT CASES
ON DEFAMATION TO 1600, at xxvi-xli (R.H. Helmholz ed., 1985) (setting out the
requirements for a libel claim at that time).
69. VIRGINIA COLONIAL MINUTES, supra note 21, at 194-95.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 195. When serving as a soldier, for example, Hall presented as a male; but
when Hall was looking for work in the "needle trades" or as a maid-servant, Hall
presented as a female. Id. Hall is also speculated to have switched back to a male identity






77. Id. Some contemporary courts have upheld similar requirements in cases involving
pre-operative transsexuals. See, e.g., Doe v. Boeing Co., 846 P.2d 531, 538 (Wash. 1993)
(upholding a Boeing requirement that a male-to-female transsexual dress in "unisex"
clothing until her operation).
78. FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 40, at 111-12. Another early case involved an
attempt by Levi Suydam to vote in an 1843 election in Connecticut. Id. at 30. The
opposing party objected on the ground that Suydam was female (and at that point, females
had not yet been granted the right to vote). Id. After an examination by a physician,
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court's ruling acknowledges that Hall could not be fairly classified as
either a man or a woman. But Hall also exposes the mutability of
sexual identity, which the court acknowledges but does not tolerate.79
Before the court's order, Hall's practice had been to switch back
and forth between male and female, depending on the needs of the
moment.8" This moving between sexual identities was actually
somewhat consistent with broader cultural practices at the time.
Many young boys dressed in female clothing, primarily as a means of
demarcating their lower social status, before becoming men.81 And
popular songs told stories of women dressing in men's clothing to
serve in combat.82
Like female combatants and young boys dressing as women
before puberty, Hall used clothing to help construct different sexual
identities. 3 What seemed to trouble the community in Hall's case,
however, was how well Hall "passed." When Hall dressed as a female,
Hall seemed like a "real" female; the same was true when Hall
dressed like a male. Indeed, Hall's performances of the two sides of
binary sexual identity were so successful that the community was
forced to ask for legal help in designating Hall with a fixed sexual
identity.
Hall is one of the few recorded cases involving an intersex
individual. This aspect of the case, as well as the fact that it raised
issues concerning the artificiality and mutability of sexual identity,
make it a good example of how tort litigation can raise questions
about the assumption that "real" sexual identity is binary.'
however, Suydam was declared "male" and permitted to vote. Id. A few days later, the
physician discovered that Suydam also had female attributes. Id. It is unknown whether
the vote was revoked. Id.
79. VIRGINIA COLONIAL RECORDS, supra note 21, at 195 (holding that Hall is both a
man and a woman and ordering that Hall should now "goe Clothed" in both men's and
women's apparel).
80. Id. at 194-95 (describing how Hall dressed in women's apparel "to get a bitt for
my Catt" and to work in the needle trade but wore men's apparel for other purposes,
including travel).
81. Ulrich, supra note 58, at 46.
82. Id.
83. See VIRGINIA COLONIAL MINUTES, supra note 21, at 194-95 (describing how Hall
dressed in women's apparel when wishing to appear as a woman and men's clothing when
wishing to appear as a man).
84. There are no recent cases like Hall involving intersexed adults, probably because
medical treatments now aim at assigning binary sexual identity, through surgery or
otherwise, at a very early age. See, e.g., Peter A. Lee et al., Consensus Statement on
Management of Intersex Disorders, 118 PEDIATRICS e488, e491 (2006) ("Expediting a
thorough ... decision is required."). These practices, along with the secrecy surrounding
the treatment of intersex infants, effectively make the intersex population disappear,
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Like Hall, many cases today challenge conventional assumptions
about sexual identity. These challenges revolve around three key
issues: (1) whether sexual identity is really binary; (2) whether sexual
identity is really immutable; and (3) whether sexual identity is really
natural. The most obvious examples in tort litigation involve
transsexuals. As in the Hall case, contemporary tort litigation
involving transsexuals challenges the assumption that sexual identity
is fixed. More fundamentally, the cases expose the artificiality of
binary sexual identity.
A. Tort Claims Involving Transsexuals
One of the most cited tort cases involving a transsexual is
Littleton v. Prange." Christie Littleton underwent sex reassignment
surgery in adulthood to appear physically as a woman.86 A few years
later, she married Jonathan Littleton and lived with him until his
death.87 The legality of this marriage was not questioned until after
Jonathan Littleton died.88 After Jonathan Littleton died, Christie
Littleton filed a wrongful death claim against her husband's doctor in
her capacity as the surviving spouse.89 The doctor argued that the case
should be dismissed because Christie Littleton was not a "real"
woman and therefore could not be the surviving spouse of Jonathan
Littleton." The trial court agreed and entered summary judgment for
the doctor.9"
On appeal, an intermediate court emphasized that the key
question before the court was whether "Christie [is] a man or a
woman?"'  In attempting to answer this question, the court
acknowledged that Christie Littleton currently had the "anatomical
and genital features" of a female and that she had "the capacity to
sometimes even to themselves. See Claude J. Migeon et al., 46,XY Intersex Individuals:
Phenotypic and Etiologic Classification, Knowledge of Condition, and Satisfaction with
Knowledge in Adulthood, 110 PEDIATRICS e32, e32 (2002) (noting that many intersexed
individuals are not well informed about their medical and surgical history and may even be
unaware that they underwent surgery).
85. 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 872 (2000).
86. Id. at 224.
87. See id. at 225.
88. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10, Littleton v. Prange, 531 U.S. 872 (2000)
(No. 00-25) (noting, among other things, that the legality of the Littleton's marriage was
recognized by the Attorney General of Texas who required Christie Littleton to pay child
support for Jonathan Littleton's children from an earlier marriage).
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function sexually as a female."93 The court also acknowledged that
some physicians would consider her a female.94 For the court,
however, the most important question was not what Christie Littleton
looked like now, but whether Christie Littleton was "created and
born a male."95 Because Christie Littleton's female anatomy was "all
man-made,"96 the court reasoned she was not a real woman. 97 As a
result, her marriage to Jonathan Littleton was illegal, and she could
not recover as his surviving spouse. 98
The dissent objected on many grounds, including the fact that a
Texas court had previously altered Christie Littleton's birth
certificate to reflect her changed sexual identity.99 "If Christie's
evidence that she was female was satisfactory enough" to amend her
birth certificate, one judge asked, why was it not satisfactory enough
to satisfy the court in this case?' 0 For the dissent, the appropriate test
was not the sexual identity assigned to Christie Littleton at birth, but
the identity Christie Littleton embraced herself and had successfully
presented to the community for many years.'1
Although the court ultimately rejected the legitimacy of Christie
Littleton's post-operative sexual identity, the case exposes both the
mutability of sexual identity and its artificiality. Like Hall, Littleton
forced the court to confront a litigant who had successfully changed
her sexual identity, even as the court's own working assumptions
about sexual identity insisted that sexual identity could not be
changed. And, like Hall, Littleton also exposed how difficult it can be
to determine an individual's "natural" sexual identity.
Other tort cases involving transsexuals have similar effects.
Medical malpractice claims by prisoners seeking to initiate or
complete gender reassignment surgery, for example, expose the
mutability and artificiality of sexual identity.0 2 These cases charge
93. Id. It is unclear exactly what the court meant when it concluded that Littleton had
"the capacity to function sexually as a female." Id. However, it seems likely that the court
meant that, as a result of her surgery, she was capable of receiving a penis vaginally. See id.
94. Id. at 231.
95. Id.
96. Id. This is the court's language, which apparently was not intended to indicate the
sex of the surgeon.
97. Id. at 230.
98. Id. at 231.
99. Id. at 233 (Lopez, J., dissenting).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 232.
102. See, e.g., Praylor v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 430 F.3d 1208, 1209 (5th Cir.
2005) (holding the prisoner was not entitled to hormone treatment to treat
transsexualism); Brown v. Zavaras, 63 F.3d 967, 970 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding the prisoner
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prison doctors and prisons with improper conduct in refusing to
effectuate changes in prisoners' sexual identities."3 That prisoners
could even make such a claim highlights the fact that sexual identity
can be changed and artificially reconstructed.
But these cases also challenge the assumed linkage between
biology and "real" sexual identity. This is because, in order to prove
their case, the plaintiffs must present testimony that they have been
diagnosed with "gender identity disorder," for which sex
reassignment surgery is a recommended treatment.1" A diagnosis of
gender identity disorder, however, hinges on a doctor's conclusion
that the patient's body is at odds with the individual's "real" sexual
identity° 5-a conclusion that directly challenges the assumption that
''real" sexual identity can be determined by reference to biology.
Tort litigation aimed at protecting the privacy interests of post-
operative transsexuals also exposes the mutability and artificiality of
sexual identity. To make out a claim, the plaintiffs must establish that
they had a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the fact
may be entitled to hormone treatment for transsexualism); Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F.
Supp. 2d 156, 162 (D. Mass. 2002) (seeking injunctive relief requiring medical treatment
for gender identity disorder); see also Rebecca Boone, Idaho Settles Transgender Suit,
SPOKESMAN-REV. (Spokane, Wash.), Aug. 7, 2009, at A8, available at
http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2009/aug/07/idaho-settles-transgender-suit.htm
(describing a recent settlement in which the state of Idaho agreed to change its policies
regarding medical treatment for transsexuals seeking treatment). See generally Alvin Lee,
Trans Models in Prison: The Medicalization of Gender Identity and the Eighth Amendment
Right to Sex Reassignment Therapy, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 447 (2008) (discussing
applications of trans models in the prison health care context and the evolution of Eighth
Amendment protections for transsexual prisoners).
103. See, e.g., Praylor, 430 F.3d at 1209; Brown, 63 F.3d at 970; Kosilek, 221 F. Supp. 2d
at 162.
104. See, e.g., Kosilek, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 184 (discussing significance of the plaintiff's
diagnosis of gender identity disorder to her claim); see also DSM-IV, supra note 36, at 577
(defining gender identity disorder); THE HARRY BENJAMIN INT'L GENDER DYSPHORIA
ASS'N, STANDARDS OF CARE FOR GENDER IDENTITY DISORDERS 18 (6th ed. 2001),
available at http://www.wpath.org/Documents2/socv6.pdf (setting out the recommended
treatments). Prisoners suing for failure to provide medical treatment related to the
initiation or completion of transsexual surgery may proceed under an ordinary medical
malpractice theory against the physicians involved or under constitutional tort theories
against the institution. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Officers, 403 U.S. 388, 395 (1971)
(recognizing a cause of action in tort for constitutional violations). Most cases, however,
have proceeded under constitutional tort theories. See, e.g., Praylor, 430 F.3d at 1209;
Brown, 63 F.3d at 970; Kosilek, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 162. With respect to the initial
evaluation of the medical treatment involved, however, the issues are the same. See Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S 97, 104 (1976) (holding that deliberate indifference to a serious
medical condition constitutes a constitutional violation).
105. See, e.g., Kosilek, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 163; see also DSM-IV, supra note 36, at 581
(setting out the diagnostic criteria for gender identity disorder).
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that they underwent surgery to change their sexual identity. °6 In Diaz
v. Oakland Tribune, Inc.,10° for example, a post-operative transsexual
filed an invasion of privacy claim, when her pre-operative sexual
identity was revealed without her consent. °8  The defendant
newspaper attempted to defend against the claim on the ground that
publication of the plaintiff's sex change was privileged under the First
Amendment because the information was a matter of legitimate
public concern. 1°9 Specifically, the newspaper argued that their
publication of the plaintiff's sex change was newsworthy because the
plaintiff had been the first female president of the student body at her
college. u °
A jury found for the plaintiff and awarded over $250,000 in
damages.' On appeal, the defendant again argued that plaintiff's
sexual identity was newsworthy as a matter of law.1 2 The court
rejected this argument, however, and held that the jury was the best
arbiter of whether the plaintiff's transsexual status was newsworthy. 1 3
The court's conclusion is significant because it acknowledges the
mutability and artificiality of the plaintiff's sexual identity but still
allows the jury to punish the defendant for making those facts public.
In other words, the message from the court is that real sexual identity
is, in fact, mutable and artificial, but a jury may conclude that it is best
for everyone to pretend that it is not. In short, like other claims
involving transsexuals, invasion of privacy litigation that is brought on
behalf of post-operative transsexuals exposes the mutability and
artificiality of sexual identity. At the same time, these claims also
affirm the cultural importance of keeping this information secret in
any given case.11 4
The success of such claims also suggests that courts are now
dealing with the mutability of sexual identity in a different way. In the
Hall case, the court ordered Hall to present a "dual" sexual identity
that was, in the court's view, consistent with Hall's biology as both
106. See Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 771 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
107. 188 Cal. Rptr. 762 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
108. Id. at 764; see also Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I., 794 F. Supp. 72, 75
(D.R.I. 1992) (holding that a transsexual plaintiff had the right to sue under a fictitious
name when litigating claims stemming from sex change surgery).
109. Diaz, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 767-68.
110. Id. at 766.
111. Id. at 765.
112. Id. at 765-66.
113. Id. at 773.
114. See id. at 771 (noting that while the plaintiff's gender was clearly a matter in the




"man and woeman." 5 In contemporary invasion of privacy cases,
however, courts seem to be sending a different message. As advances
in sex assignment surgery make it easier to fake sexual identity, courts
now seem more willing to provide protection to those who conceal
the faking.
Slander claims involving allegations of intersexuality raise
different issues. As compared to cases involving transsexuals, these
cases highlight the fragility of the assumption that sexual identity is
binary. In Malone v. Stewart,'16 for example, a court held that an
allegation that the plaintiff was a "hermaphrodite" constituted
defamation per se." 7 For the court to hold that an allegation of
intersexuality poses a threat to one's reputation, however, the court
must at least tacitly concede that, in some cases, there are insufficient
indicators to clearly identify someone within the binary categories.
Otherwise, there would be no need for the lawsuit, as the statements
would be considered so outlandish that they are incapable of having a
defamatory meaning or effect."8
B. Tort Claims Involving Products Used to Amplify and Construct
Sexual Identity
In Hall, Littleton, and other cases involving transsexuals or
allegations of intersexuality, the question of sexual identity is directly
115. VIRGINIA COLONIAL MINUTES, supra note 21, at 195.
116. 15 Ohio 319 (1846) (in bank).
117. See id. at 321 (involving allegations that Stewart had falsely referred to Malone as
a "hermaphrodite"). There are no recent slander cases involving intersex allegations. It is
interesting to note, however, that current law is split on whether calling someone a
"homosexual" is defamation per se. See, e.g., Hayes v. Smith, 832 P.2d 1022, 1023 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1991) (holding that an accusation of homosexuality is not susceptible of
defamatory meaning); Callahan v. First Congregational Church of Haverhill, 808 N.E.2d
301, 304 (Mass. 2004) (holding that an accusation of homosexuality may be "reasonably
susceptible to defamatory meaning"); Gray v. Press Commc'ns, LLC, 775 A.2d 678, 684
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (same); Key v. Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Corr., 598 N.E.2d
207, 209 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1990) (holding that an accusation of homosexuality is not
defamation per se, though the plaintiffs could recover for proved damages).
118. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988) (holding that parody
does not state a claim for libel when it cannot reasonably be understood to be referring to
actual facts); Ward v. Zelikovsky, 643 A.2d 972, 979 (N.J. 1994) (noting that even vulgar
name-calling is not normally actionable as defamation because it is not understood to be
making statements of fact). The justification for not permitting defamation claims to be
brought in such cases is that the statements are not widely understood to be referring to a
factual state of affairs. Hustler, 485 U.S. at 57. To allow defamation claims for the
statement that someone is a "hermaphrodite," in contrast, suggests that the statement is
capable of being understood as referring to a factual state of affairs. See Malone, 15 Ohio
at 321. In other words, to allow such claims is to acknowledge that there are, in fact, some
individuals who are intersexed and therefore fall outside a binary sexual categorization.
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at issue. Other tort cases also challenge assumptions about the
immutable and naturally binary qualities of sexual identity, but in
more subtle ways. Cases involving products that are used to amplify
or construct the bodily indicators of sexual identity provide good
examples of this. As in cases involving transsexuals, these cases
expose the artificiality of sexual identity in a very dramatic fashion by
demonstrating the large numbers of people engaged in artificial
sexual identity construction.
Perhaps the best known litigation involving a product that is used
to amplify and construct a key indicator of sexual identity is the
breast implant litigation.119 Like genitalia, breasts symbolize the
differentiation of binary sexual identity. 2 ' Medical literature
describes breasts of an appropriate size and shape as "essential to a
woman's mental health ... and well being. "121
Individuals with breasts that are deemed too small are diagnosed
with a condition called "micromastia" and, along with those who have
lost breasts due to mastectomy, are recommended for surgery to
amplify or replace breasts with artificial implants.12 1 Others choose to
undergo implantation surgery so as to "emphasize something
specifically female about themselves. 1 23
Much like sex reassignment surgery, breast implantation
practices expose the artificiality of sexual identity.1 24 This is because
breast implants provide a means by which individuals can "fake" a
bodily attribute that is typically associated with natural or biological
sexual difference. This is true regardless of the reasons for the
"faking." The implants used by transsexuals and individuals who have
lost their breasts to cancer are the same. In both instances, the
resulting performance of femininity is, at least in part, artificially
achieved.
119. See generally Bloom, supra note 25 (examining breast implant litigation to reveal
how the legal system artificially constructs society's sex categorizations).
120. See, e.g., Jan Gehorsam, Women Feeling Pressured to Sculpt a Perfect Body,
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 29, 1992, at Al (noting that being a woman means being
"sexy" and "sexy means breasty").
121. Julie M. Spanbauer, Breast Implants as Beauty Ritual: Woman's Sceptre and
Prison, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 157, 182 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Rebecca Weisman, Reforms in Medical Device Regulation: An Examination of
the Silicone Gel Breast Implant Debacle, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 973, 990 (1993)).
122. Id. at 183.
123. Charlotte Allen, Jurisprudence of Breasts, STAN. L. & POL'Y REV., Spring 1994, at
83, 83-84.
124. Bloom, supra note 25, at 104.
125. This is not to say that individuals without breasts or individuals who undergo
breast implantation are "fake" women. The point here is simply that, in some instances,
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To the extent that implantation surgery is successful and the
artificial breasts seem "real" to all observers, breast implantation
practices help individuals designated as "female" to "pass" as women.
At the same time, surgical implantation practices reveal a gap
between the expectation of "natural" binary sexual identity and the
physical experience of being male or female.
126
For years, the most popular breast implants were made of
silicone.127 In the early 1970s, however, some silicone implant
recipients began to sue implant manufacturers, complaining that the
implants were rupturing and leaking. 28 Some individuals also alleged
serious health effects associated with ruptured and leaking
implants. 129 By the 1990s, hundreds of thousands of litigants had filed
suit 30 In the process, the widespread practice of artificial sexual
identity construction through the use of breast implants was exposed.
On a global level, the breast implant litigation exposed the large
number of individuals undergoing artificial sexual identity
construction. Newspapers reported regularly on the litigation and the
number of individuals affected.' What these reports revealed was
that a large majority of the implant recipients were not seeking to
replace a breast lost to cancer but rather were attempting to amplify
their natural bodies so as to emphasize something more "female"
about them.32
law and medicine treat them as incomplete and therefore in need of artificial help to pass
as women. Put differently, breasts do not make you a woman, but, from the perspective of
law and medicine, they are a key indicator of female sexual identity.
126. See BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER, supra note 17, at 10 ("[S]ex acquires its
naturalized effect, and, yet it is also by virtue of this reiteration that gaps and fissures are
opened up as the constitutive instabilities in such constructions, as that which escapes or
exceeds the norm, as that which cannot be wholly defined or fixed by the repetitive labor
of that norm.").
127. H.J. Berkel, Breast Augmentation: A Risk Factor For Cancer?, 326 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 1649, 1649 (1992).
128. Bloom, supra note 25, at 101 n.83.
129. Id. at 100.
130. See Barnaby J. Feder, Dow Corning's Bankruptcy: The Impact on Implant Suits,
N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1995, at F9.
131. See, e.g., Tamar Lewin, As Silicone Issue Grows, Women Take Agony and Anger
to Court, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1992, at Al (describing the onslaught of lawsuits against the
manufacturers of breast implants after the Food and Drug Administration imposed a
"moratorium on silicone implants"); Feder, supra note 130 ("[B]etween 650,000 and one
million women received silicone breast implants during the 1970s and 1980s .... ").
132. See, e.g., Lewin, supra note 131 (reporting on the decision of Brenda Toole to
undergo implantation for larger breasts); Judy Mann, Implanting Corporate Responsibility,
WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 1992, at E3 (noting in her column that of the estimated one million
American women who had received silicone implants, only about twenty percent were
reconstructing breasts lost to cancer while eighty percent were seeking larger breasts);
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The litigation also exposed particular individuals who had
engaged in artificial sexual identity construction through the use of
breast implants. Individuals necessarily revealed their identities and
histories of artificial sexual identity construction simply by filing suit
or seeking compensation through class action settlements.
Although the breast implant litigation received greater attention
from the media, penile and testicular implant recipients filed similar
cases, alleging many of the same problems with their implants.'33
Many penile implant recipients also alleged that the implants failed to
operate properly.' Like the breast implant litigation, the penile and
testicular implant litigation involved very large numbers of people,
exposing widespread practices of artificial sexual identity
construction, on both the global and personal levels. 3 '
The facts of these cases closely tracked the stories of plaintiffs in
the breast implant litigation. Like breasts, penises and testicles are
widely perceived as "natural" indicators of male sexual identity. As
with breast implant recipients, some penile and testicular implant
recipients used the implants to artificially reconstruct body parts that
were lost to injury or disease.'36 Others, however, sought to amplify
bodies in their previously unaltered condition.'37 In both cases, the
practices revealed the importance of artificial measures in the
construction of binary sexual difference.
The individuals who underwent penile and testicular implant
surgeries did so as a means of artificially constructing and/or
emphasizing a key cultural indicator of masculinity and "natural"
More than Her Bust Gets a Boost, USA TODAY, Sept. 28, 1993, at 4D (describing one
woman's decision to get breast implants to increase her self-esteem).
133. See, e.g., In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 1996 FED App. 0049P, 3 (6th Cir.), 75 F.3d
1069, 1074 (considering class certification for an action involving allegedly defective penile
implants); Goldsmith v. Mentor, 913 F. Supp. 56, 57 (D.N.H. 1995) (alleging defective
testicular implant).
134. See, e.g., In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 1996 FED App., 25 n.14, 75 F.3d at 1081 n.14;
Goldsmith, 913 F. Supp. at 57.
135. Shari Roan, Silicone Implants: Men's Turn to Worry, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1993 at
El (estimating that approximately 28,000 individuals receive penile implants each year).
The number of individuals alleging injury for their use was sufficiently large to result in a
class action. See In re Am. Med. Sys. Inc., 1996 FED App., 23, 75 F.3d at 1079-80.
136. See Jim McCartney, Implanting Self-Image: Mentor Corp. Hopes the
Reintroduction of Gel-Filled Artificial Testicles Will Help Restore Emotional Health to Men
Who've Experienced Cancer or Other Trauma, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Aug. 7, 2005, at
1D; see also John C. Gleason, Failed Penile Implant Sufferers Seek Legal Remedy,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 12, 1993, at B1 (citing testosterone deficiencies, arterial
constrictions, nerve disorders, and diseases such as diabetes as causes of impotence in men
who obtain penile implants).
137. See McCartney, supra note 136.
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sexual difference. When the implants failed, they exposed the fact
that, in some instances, this difference is not only not "natural" but
also that some individuals were employing artificial help to more
successfully construct a "male" identity.
Litigation over breast, penile, and testicular implants directly
exposed the role of artificial products in constructing binary, sexual
identity. The fen-phen litigation, in contrast, provides an example of
how tort litigation involving a product that was not ostensibly linked
to sexual identity may also expose the artificiality of sexual identity
construction. Fen-phen was a weight loss drug, which studies now link
with heart valve damage. 38 The combination of drugs which
constituted fen-phen, however, was never approved by the Food and
Drug Administration.139 Despite this, many doctors prescribed the
drug, sometimes to help people lose as little as ten pounds. 40 The fen-
phen litigation sought to hold manufacturers liable for encouraging
and ignoring these off-label uses.141 A nationwide class action
settlement resulted, which provided compensation for those injured
by fen-phen and heart screening for individuals at risk for future
problems.142
In the course of the litigation, it became clear that some six
million Americans had used fen-phen for weight loss.' 43 Most of these
individuals were women.'" Although fen-phen worked the same on
138. See In re Diet Drug Prod. Liab. Litig., 220 F. Supp. 2d 414, 416 (E.D. Pa. 2002)
(fen-phen litigation). Fen-phen is an abbreviation for the combination of the drugs
fenfluramine and phentermine. John T. Evans & Robert L. Kerner, Jr., A Primer on Fen-
Phen Litigation: Allegations & Defenses, 65 DEF. COUNS. J. 353, 353 (1998).
139. See Evans & Kerner, Jr., supra note 138, at 353. The Food and Drug
Administration had approved each drug separately but not in combination. Id. Because of
this, uses of fen-phen are frequently referred to as "off-label" uses. See id.
140. See Caren A. Crisanti, Comment, Product Liability and Prescription Diet Drug
Cocktail, Fen-Phen: A Hard Combination to Swallow, 15 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 207, 209-10, 242-43 (1998) (noting that physicians prescribed fen-phen for women
to lose between ten and twenty pounds).
141. See In re Diet Drug Prod. Liab. Litig., 220 F. Supp. 2d at 424.
142. See David J. Morrow, Fen-Phen Maker to Pay Billions in Settlement of Diet-Injury
Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1999, at Al; see also Amended and Restated AHP Settlement
Trust Agreement, In re Diet Drugs, 2:99-cv-20593-HB (E.D. Pa. July 1, 2005), available at
http://www.settlementdietdrugs.com/pdfs/Exhibit2 Amended andRestated AHPSettle
ment_- TrustAgreement.pdf (laying out the final amended settlement agreement to
provide compensation to qualified class members).
143. See Morrow, supra note 142.
144. See Apryl A. Ference, Rushing to Judgment on Fen-Phen and Redux: Were the
FDA, Drug Manufacturers, and Doctors Too Quick to Respond to Americans' Infatuation
with a Cure-All Diet Pill for Weight Loss?, 9 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 77, 102 (1998);
Crisanti, supra note 140, at 209-10, 242-43.
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everyone, doctors prescribed it primarily to women.145 Doctors
justified this dangerous off-label use by citing its importance in
helping the individuals involved to feel "more female."' 46
These cases reveal the increasing use of sometimes dramatic
artificial measures to amplify and construct binary sexual difference.
When the products and practices work, the individuals "pass" more
successfully as members of their designated sex. Because the cases
expose these products and practices as artificial, however, the cases
necessarily raise questions about the "realness" of the markers of
binary sexual identity. The next Part argues that when faced with this
evidence in tort litigation, courts privilege narratives which treat
sexual identity as if it were naturally binary, even as the cases in front
of them suggest the opposite.
II. TORT LITIGATION PRIVILEGES NARRATIVES OF SEXUAL
IDENTITY WHICH STATE THAT SEXUAL IDENTITY IS, OR SHOULD
BE, IMMUTABLE, NATURAL, AND BINARY
This Part aims to expose the often subtle ways in which
assumptions about sexual identity are both repeated and enforced in
tort litigation. The cases are organized around three central themes.
The first is the notion that sexual identity is, or should be, immutable.
The second focuses on the claim that sexual identity is, or should be,
natural, meaning evidenced by biological indicators existing at birth.
The third theme explores how tort litigation says that sexual identity
is, or should be, binary. The discussion utilizes the cases discussed in
Part I but also introduces several new cases and emerging areas of
litigation involving sex assignment surgery on intersex children.
A. Tort Litigation Sends a Message that Sexual Identity Is, or Should
Be, Immutable
Despite evidence from the key litigants in both Hall and Littleton
that their sexual identity had undergone change, the courts in both
cases found that sexual identity is immutable.'47 Of the two cases, Hall
is perhaps the most interesting in this regard. There, the court
145. Ference, supra note 144, at 102.
146. See id. (noting that fen-phen was primarily prescribed to women as a means to
promote the" 'Barbie-like' image" that society idolized).
147. See VIRGINIA COLONIAL MINUTES, supra note 21, at 195 (describing Hall's
practice of changing sexual identities depending on the circumstances); Littleton v.
Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 224 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999) (noting that Littleton had undergone sex




acknowledged that Hall was, in fact, "both a man and a woeman" but
insisted that Hall preserve the immutability of this status by dressing
as both a man and a woman at all times and not switching back and
forth, as Hall had done in the past.148
For the court, requiring Hall to dress as a man and a woman was
ostensibly about preventing Hall from committing any sort of fraud or
deception in future dealings with individuals who might otherwise be
confused about Hall's sexual identity.1 49 But, of course, there would
be no possibility of deception without the cultural expectation that
sexual identity is, or should be, fixed. When confronted with Hall's
more fluid practice of sexual identity, the court was faced with a
choice: recognize the reality of Hall's capacity for a mutable sexual
identity (at least within the confines of a binary sexual identity
regime) and allow it to continue unregulated or, alternatively, enforce
the dominant understanding of sexual identity in the community,
which said that sexual identity should not change.15 ° By choosing the
latter, the court placed the community's narrative of sexual identity
(at least with respect to immutability) in a legally privileged position,
while at the same time ensuring that Hall's alternative performance of
sexual identity would be effectively silenced in the future.151
Littleton, too, emphasized the fundamental immutability of
sexual identity, in the face of compelling evidence to the contrary.
The court in Littleton heard uncontroverted evidence that Littleton
had the "anatomical and genital features" of a female and that she
had "the capacity to function sexually as a female."' 52 Indeed, the
parties agreed and submitted two affidavits both stating that she "is
medically a woman" (whatever that meant to the affiants). 153
Nevertheless, the court concluded that Christie Littleton's post-
operative female identity was not sufficiently "real" to qualify her for
marriage to a male and, ultimately, recovery of wrongful death
benefits as his surviving spouse.15 4
148. VIRGINIA COLONIAL MINUTES, supra note 21, at 195.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. Id. In fact, it is not clear that Hall was actually stopped from switching between
(and perhaps among) identities. There is no further record of Hall after this case. See
Ulrich, supra note 58, at 45-46. Hall may have moved to a different part of the country,
where there may have been less possibility of detection. See id at 46.
152. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 225.
153. Id. at 224-25.
154. Id. at 231. In a bizarre legal twist, the Attorney General of Texas apparently
reached the opposite conclusion. As Littleton's attorneys noted, the Attorney General
considered Ms. Littleton sufficiently "real" to be required to pay child support for Mr.
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According to the court, Littleton could not be a "real" female
because she was "created and born a male."'55 Even though Littleton
was, according to the court, anatomically and physically no longer a
male, the court insisted that her sexual identity, having once been
designated male on her original birth certificate, could not change." 6
To acknowledge the transition as "real" would require the court also
to acknowledge that sexual identity is, in fact, mutable. In the court's
words: "The deeper philosophical (and now legal) question is: can a
physician change the gender of a person with a scalpel, drugs and
counseling, or is a person's gender immutably fixed by our Creator at
birth?' '15 7
Christie Littleton's very existence, of course, provides an answer
to this question. By all appearances, including the medical evidence in
the case, her sexual identity did change successfully. 8 The only issue
was the court's unwillingness to accept the evidence of this change.
This refusal did more than simply deny Christie Littleton the right to
sue for her husband's wrongful death. By insisting that sexual identity
is immutable, the court endorsed a particular narrative of sexual
identity that is at odds with human experience.
In doing so, the court sent a clear message that, in its own words,
had both "philosophical" and "legal" implications.'59 This message
states that sexual identity is "immutably fixed by our Creator at
birth."'6°
B. Tort Litigation Sends a Message that Sexual Identity Is, or Should
Be, Natural
In the Littleton case, the evidence that Littleton was not a "real"
woman was not limited to the apparent mutability of the bodily
indicators of Littleton's sexual identity. 6' The court was also
concerned with the artificiality of Littleton's sexual identity
construction.162 The fact that Littleton's female anatomy was "all
man-made" was viewed as highly significant and key to its conclusion
Littleton's children from a prior marriage, when Mr. Littleton was ill and unemployed. See
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11, Littleton v. Prange, 531 U.S. 872 (2000) (No. 00-25).
155. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 231.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 224.
158. Id. at 225.
159. Id. at 224.
160. Id. In light of the references to "our Creator," the court's ruling seems to have had
religious implications as well. See id.




that Littleton was not a "real" female. '63 But the court also relied on
chromosomes to determine Littleton's "real" sexual identity." 4 This
was necessary because, for the physicians testifying in the case, Ms.
Littleton's present physical anatomy was the key indicator of her
sexual identity. 6 '
The court did not actually receive evidence of Ms. Littleton's
chromosomal status, however; nor did it receive evidence of her
husband's chromosomes.' 66 Instead, the court assumed that both Ms.
Littleton and her husband had "male" (or XY) chromosomal
structures at birth based on their initial designations as male on their
birth certificates. 67 In fact, many individuals who appear "male" at
birth do not have an XY chromosomal structure.168 Although it is
likely that Christie Littleton's chromosomes indicated an XY status,
the fact that the court assumed this information without receiving
evidence on the point is significant because it suggests the extent to
which the court's understanding of "natural" sexual identity rests
more on cultural expectations than medical or scientific fact.
Once it decided to determine Ms. Littleton's sexual identity, the
court had the option of choosing among any number of variables,
both "natural" and artificial to assist in its decision. 169 For the
physicians testifying in the case, Ms. Littleton's present physical
163. Id. at 231.
164. Id. at 230.
165. Id. at 224-25.
166. Id. at 231.
167. Id.
168. See generally Ben-Asher, supra note 36 (discussing cultural understandings of
gender and sex distinctions as applied by courts); Ute Thyen et al., Deciding on Gender in
Children with Intersex Conditions: Considerations and Controversies, 4 TREATMENTS IN
ENDOCRINOLOGY 1 (2005) (noting the cultural influences in making medical decisions for
intersex children). This is because chromosomal structure is considerably more variable
than a simple XX equals female and XY equals male classification. See Karen Gurney, Sex
and the Surgeon's Knife: The Family Court's Dilemma ... Informed Consent and the
Specter of latrogenic Harm to Children with Intersex Characteristics, 33 AM. J.L. & MED.
625, 625-30 (2007). Some individuals, for example, have some cells that are XX and others
that are XY. Id. at 628 ("[Cllear genital ambiguity, such as hermaphroditism, involv[es]
mosaicism in which some cells are XY and others are XX."). Others are born with an extra
X or Y or only one X. Id. at 629; see also Ben-Asher, supra note 36, at 52 n.2 (describing
the chromosomal composition of intersex individuals). Also, some people develop physical
and/or personality traits that do not correspond with what is expected for individuals with
their chromosomal structure. See Ben-Asher, supra note 36, at 85. Some XX individuals,
for example, have both ovaries and external genitalia that appear "male." Id. Because of
this variation, some medical experts consider the appearance of external genitalia as
potentially more important than chromosomes in determining sexual identity. Id.
169. See Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 227; see also In re Estate of Gardiner (Gardiner 1), 22
P.3d 1086, 1110 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001) (considering an array of factors in a case raising
similar issues), affd in part, rev'd in part, 42 P.3d. 120, 137 (2002).
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anatomy and other factors outweighed her presumed chromosomal
status.17° Despite this evidence, the court treated Ms. Littleton's
presumably male chromosomes as definitive evidence that Ms.
Littleton was "biologically" a male.'7' This emphasis is indicative of
the court's own view that sexual identity is, or should be, natural.172
Perhaps more important is the fact that the court took this stance in
opposition to the testimony of medical experts. 173 For the court to do
so shows that it was determined to send a message that "real" sexual
identity is "natural," regardless of what the medical community or
others had to say about it.
Like Littleton, the Hall case sent a message that "real" sexual
identity is natural but, in the Hall case, with a significantly different
outcome. Because Hall's sexual identity appeared, upon physical
inspection, to have biological indicators consistent with the
expectations for both males and females, the court ordered Hall to
wear clothing and display a sexual identity that reflected Hall's
natural dual status. 74 The outcome is interesting because it suggests
the extent to which the court deemed it more important to emphasize
a natural presentation of sexual identity than one which was rigidly
binary.
Although Hall does not appear to have been charged with a
crime, the court's order had the air of punishment about it.'75 To
present as something other than one's natural self was considered a
deception that the Hall court considered intolerable. 76 Something
similar has taken place in more contemporary tort cases involving
litigants who presented their sexual identity in ways that the court did
not consider sufficiently "natural." In these cases, courts have
punished the presentation of "faked" sexual identity with findings of
contributory negligence and smaller damage awards.
Perhaps the most troubling example of this involves the civil
litigation that followed in the wake of the murder of Brandon Teena,
whose story was popularized in the Academy Award-winning film
Boys Don't Cry.'77 Teena, a transgender 7 8 male, was murdered after
170. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 225.
171. Id. at 230.
172. See id. at 230-31.
173. See id. at 224-25.
174. VIRGINIA COLONIAL MINUTES, supra note 21, at 195.
175. Ulrich, supra note 58, at 45 (noting that the case came up on ambiguous charges).
176. Id. at 45-48.
177. BOYS DON'T CRY (Killer Films/Hart-Sharp Entertainment 1999).
178. See id. The term "transgender" typically signifies an individual's rejection of
traditional concepts of gender. See Susan Stryker, (De)Subjugated Knowledges: An
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reporting a rape to the local sheriff's department.'79 Teena's mother
then sued the county for his wrongful death, alleging negligence and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 8
At trial, the court found that the county had been negligent and
estimated damages at approximately $80,000."' However, the court
then went on to reduce the amount of the award by eighty-five
percent because of the actions of the killers, and by one percent for
the contributory negligence of Teena. 82 Although the court did not
detail its findings with respect to the contributory negligence holding,
the clear message of the ruling was that Teena's transgender status
was itself a form of negligence, justifying reduction of the award
under the local comparative fault statute.83
The lower court's finding that Teena had been contributorily
negligent in his own death may also have been rooted in Teena's
refusal to continue to answer the questions of a local sheriff, whose
behavior included referring to Teena as "it."'" On appeal, the
Nebraska Supreme Court found the sheriff's behavior to be "extreme
and outrageous" as a matter of law and judged Teena's response of
refusing to continue the conversation as reasonable under the
circumstances. 185
The significance of the Nebraska Supreme Court's ruling for
legal understandings of sexual identity is unclear. On the one hand, it
might be argued that the court's characterization of the sheriff's
behavior suggested a willingness on the part of the court to recognize
a fluidity in sexual identity that the sheriff was not. It seems more
likely, however, that the court's reaction was aimed more at the
sheriff's refusal to designate Teena with a pronoun that corresponded
with a binary sexual identity regime. By referring to Teena as "it," the
sheriff suggested that Teena's sexual identity (and perhaps Teena
Introduction to Transgender Studies, in THE TRANSGENDER STUDIES READER, supra
note 8, at 1, 4. The term "transsexual," in contrast has historically referred to individuals
who desire to change their bodily sex characteristics. Id. The distinction between the two
terms, however, is eroding. Id. at 8-10.




183. See Brief for Harry Benjamin Int'l Gender Dysphoria Ass'n as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 14, at 2 ("[T]he trial court's finding of
contributory negligence may be based on the disturbing misconception that Brandon was
somehow at fault simply for existing and interacting with others as a transgender person-
i.e., for presenting himself as male rather than female.").
184. Brandon, 624 N.W.2d at 621.
185. Id. at 604.
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himself) was not cognizable. Under other circumstances, some courts
have found similar statements to constitute defamation per se.186 Had
Teena been referred to as "her" or "him," it is unlikely that the
Nebraska Supreme Court would have responded in the way it did.
In any event, it is clear that the lower court did not agree.
187
Instead, it seems that, for the lower court, the sheriff's behavior
toward Teena was an understandable response to Teena's
transgender status, which the lower court seems to have found
intolerable. More troubling, the lower court's finding of contributory
negligence by Teena suggests that the court blamed Teena, in part,
for his own death. In this respect, the lower court's conclusion in
Brandon echoes that of the court in Hall. In Hall, dressing sometimes
as a woman and other times as a man was prohibited when Hall's
natural body seemed to indicate a dual identity.'88 Similarly, the lower
court in Brandon seemed to consider it unreasonable (and a form of
negligence) for Teena to present himself as a male when his natural
body indicated a female identity.'89 As in Hall, the court concluded
that sexual identity should be natural and when it is faked, a legal
party should be held accountable or punished in some way.
More dramatic and widespread evidence of how individuals who
fake sexual identity may be indirectly punished in tort litigation can
be found in litigation over products for sexual identity construction or
amplification. In the silicone gel breast implant litigation, summarized
in Part I, hundreds of thousands of individuals filed suit for injuries 9°
following surgeries to make their bodies appear more "female." '191 In
the litigation that followed, both legal rulings from the bench and
juror outcomes distinguished between those who underwent surgery
to replace a natural breast and individuals who underwent surgery for
so-called "purely cosmetic" reasons. 192 Individuals who underwent
186. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
187. See Brandon, 624 N.W.2d at 604.
188. VIRGINIA COLONIAL MINUTES, supra note 21, at 195.
189. See Brief for Harry Benjamin Int'l Gender Dysphoria Ass'n as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 14, at 2.
190. Feder, supra note 130.
191. See Emily C. Aschinger, Note, The Selling of the Perfect Breast: Silicone, Surgeons,
and Strict Liability, 61 UMKC L. REV. 399, 407 (1992) (discussing the promotion of breast
implants through the American Society of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgeons'
("ASPRS") declaration that small breasts are "deformities" causing a "disease" and
requiring surgery for a woman's "well-being" (quoting Gehorsam, supra note 120)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
192. In Turner v. Dow Corning Corp., for example, a topless dancer who underwent
surgery for "cosmetic" purposes lost her case against Dow after the defense suggested that
her decision to undergo breast augmentation was part of a frivolous lifestyle. See Colorado
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surgery to replace a natural breast were more likely to succeed in
their cases and to receive higher damage awards.193 The explanation
for this difference in verdicts and awards was that jurors "tend to be
more sympathetic" to women who underwent breast implant surgery
to replace a natural breast.'94 It was not just jurors who were more
sympathetic, however. In early litigation over whether a claim for
strict liability might be available as a potential cause of action for
implant recipients, some defendants argued that the claim should not
be available to those who underwent surgery for reasons other than
replacing a natural breast.'95
The reasoning underlying this argument was that a strict liability
claim should not be available to these individuals because, like Teena,
they were partly at fault and contributed to their injuries by
attempting to fake sexual identity. 96 Ultimately, this argument was
rejected and implant recipients were permitted to bring strict liability
based claims, without regard to the implant recipients' motivations
for obtaining the implants.197 For some courts, though, there remained
a clear difference between using breast implants for purposes of
"restoring the body to natural form" and using them to "enhance
esteem and add to life's enjoyment."'198
On the face of it, this distinction makes no sense. The breast
implants and implantation practices used in all cases were, for
practical purposes, identical and therefore equally artificial. Because
Jury Returns Defense Verdict in Lawsuit by Topless Dancer, [Jan.-June] Prod. Safety &
Liability Rep. (BNA), at 662-63 (June 25, 1993); Jennifer Mears, Dancer Loses Implant
Lawsuit: Dow Corning Says Damage Unproven, DETROIT FREE PRESS, June 12, 1993, at
6A; see also Lee v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 721 F. Supp. 89, 91-96 (D. Md. 1989) (noting
Lee's surgery was for "breast augmentation" and utilizing technical arguments to defeat
her claim for strict liability), affd, 898 F.2d 146 (4th Cir. 1990).
193. Dennehy, supra note 18, at 54 (describing how juries punish plaintiffs "who chose
to tamper with nature").
194. Cindy Collins, Litigation Alert, INSIDE LITIG., Oct. 1997, at 10, 11.
195. See, e.g., Artiglio v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 589, 592
(Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (considering and rejecting the view that a strict liability claim should
not be available to those who underwent implantation for reasons other than replacing a
breast lost to mastectomy).
196. See 2 DOBBS, supra note 12, § 353, at 974-75. The availability of strict liability in
cases involving defectively designed products is premised on the notion that neither party
is at fault. See id.
197. Artiglio, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 592. It is perhaps not insignificant that the precedent
relied upon by the court to treat all breast implant recipients the same was a penile
implant case, in which the court had determined that it was "irrelevant" whether the
patient had "obtained a penile prosthesis for procreation, alleviation of an impotency
problem or cosmetic purposes." Hufft v. Horowitz, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 377, 383 n.9 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1992).
198. Artiglio, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 592.
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of this, there is no apparent reason to distinguish between implant
recipients who used a silicone implant to replace a breast lost to
mastectomy and someone with small breasts who wanted access to
the implants to look more feminine. In both cases, the risks and
benefits of the surgery are the same; each faces the same array of
potential health problems and, if the surgery is successful, both will
enjoy the same social and economic benefits that accompany the
successful performance of "femininity," in a culture that equates
female sexual identity with breasts of a particular size and shape.
By treating the two groups differently, however, tort litigation
sends a message that sexual identity is, or should be, natural.
Moreover, by valuing the claims differently, the law sends an implicit
message that it is wrong to "mess with nature," for purposes other
than reconstructing a "natural" state of affairs (e.g., reconstruction
after mastectomy).' 9  In short, as in the cases involving transgender
and transsexual individuals, the breast implant litigation privileges a
narrative which states that "real" sexual identity is, or should be,
natural, even while simultaneously exposing its artificiality.
C. Tort Litigation Sends a Message that Sexual Identity Is, or Should
Be, Binary
The preceding discussion shows how tort litigation demands that
sexual identity is, or should be immutable and natural. These same
cases send a third message about sexual identity: it is, or should be,
binary.
As Littleton illustrates, many tort claims, including wrongful
death, alienation of affection, loss of consortium, and negligent
infliction of emotional distress, rely upon the existence of a marital
relationship for the plaintiff to establish a claim. °° When that
relationship comes into question, then the claim itself may be in
jeopardy. In the case of transsexuals, for those courts which refuse to
recognize a marriage between a transsexual and an individual of the
same birth sex, tort litigation of this kind is not an option for the
recovery of damages stemming from negligent or intentional conduct
199. See Dennehy, supra note 18, at 54.
200. See Anne Bloom, Regulating Middlesex, in FAULT LINES: TORT LAW AS
CULTURAL PRACTICE 137, 150 (David M. Engel & Michael McCann eds., 2009)
[hereinafter FAULT LINES] (citing Bume v. Catanne, No. 184985 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 21,




which had an impact on the marriage.21 This sends a message that
sexual identity is, or should be, immutable.
At the same time, cases like Littleton also send a message that
sexual identity is, or should be, binary. This is because cases like
Littleton raise questions about the legal status of two other groups of
people who may find it challenging to fit within the confines of a
strictly binary regime: individuals whose sex does not fit easily into a
binary classification at birth and those whose external genitalia and/or
sexual identification undergo change during puberty. Under the
Littleton court's framework, you are born either male or female and,
once designated, this identity is fixed for life.02 Some individuals,
however, do not fit squarely within a binary classification of sexual
identity, even at birth.2 3 Under the court's ruling in Littleton and
under the logic of other cases employing similar reasoning, these
individuals are precluded from bringing tort claims that rely upon the
existence of a marriage between two individuals whose sexual identity
classifies them as members of the "opposite" sex at birth.
In most instances involving intersex children, a binary
classification is quickly perfected, through surgery and other means.2"4
Although the practice has come under some dispute, it was and
remains standard practice for doctors to perform binary sex
201. See Phyllis Randolph Frye & Katrina C. Rose, Responsible Representation of Your
First Transgendered Client, 66 TEX. B.J. 558, 560 (2003) (noting that the validity of the
marriage is a threshold issue for transsexuals bringing marriage-based claims); see also
Randi E. Frankle, Does Marriage Really Need Sex? A Critical Analysis of the Gender
Restriction on Marriage, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 2007, 2037 (2003) (noting that a marriage
could be successfully challenged if one person is unknowingly intersex).
202. See Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 230 (Tex. App. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S.
872 (2000).
203. See FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 40, at 51. Many individuals, for example, are
born intersex. See id. (estimating that 1.7% of the population is intersexed); see also
Melanie Blackless et al., How Sexually Dimorphic Are We? Review and Synthesis, 12 AM.
J. HUM. BIOLOGY 151, 159 (2000) (estimating that between one and two in a thousand
people have bodies which differ from the standard traits of a male or female); Greenberg,
Defining Male and Female, supra note 40, at 267 (reporting an estimate of 1-4%).
204. See Lee et al., supra note 84, at e491; Thyen et al., supra note 168, at 3; see also
Anne Tamar-Mattis, Editorial, What Is a Person's "Legal Sex?", ENDOCRINE TODAY,
May 1, 2009, http://endocrinetoday.com/view.aspx?rid=39668 [hereinafter Tamar-Mattis,
ENDOCRINE TODAY]. Although ambiguous genitalia usually pose no physical health risk,
the birth of a child with ambiguous genitalia is considered by many medical experts to be a
"social emergency" that requires immediate medical attention. Am. Acad. Pediatrics,
Evaluation of the Newborn with Developmental Anomalies of the External Genitalia, 106
PEDIATRICS 138, 138 (2000). In 2006, this policy was superseded by a new policy where
the language referring to a "social emergency" was replaced by references to parental
anxiety. See Lee et al., supra note 84, at e491.
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assignment operations on children with ambiguous genitalia.2 °5
Because the binary sex assignments take place at such an early age,
there are usually no legal records indicating intersex identities at
birth. Instead, birth certificates typically indicate the binary identities
that are subsequently constructed by doctors.20 6 As a result, these
individuals are not blocked from pursuing tort claims that require
evidence of a binary sexual identity at birth.
Many intersex infants, however, later adopt sexual identities that
are at odds with the designations made in infancy.20 7 Like transsexual
adults, they may then undergo surgery to realign their bodies to
match their identities. Similarly, some children designated "male" at
birth have undergone sex reassignment surgery following severe
genital injuries."8 For all of these individuals, evidence of a changed
birth certificate may pose legal difficulties if they attempt to pursue
claims based on the existence of a post-operative heterosexual
21
marriage. 2° Put differently, tort litigation does not consistently
recognize these individuals as viable legal subjects.
205. See Carolyn Chi, Henry Chong Lee & E. Kirk Neely, Ambiguous Genitalia in the
Newborn, 9 NEOREVIEWS e78-e84 (2008); Lee et al., supra note 84, at e491-92 (discussing
surgery on infants as part of the American Academy of Pediatrics' policy on the
"management" of intersex conditions); see also Hazel Glenn Beh & Milton Diamond, An
Emerging Ethical and Medical Dilemma: Should Physicians Perform Sex Assignment
Surgery on Infants with Ambiguous Genitalia?, 7 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 2-3 (2000)
[hereinafter Beh & Diamond, An Emerging Ethical and Medical Dilemma] (noting that
surgeries continue to be performed).
206. See Thyen et al., supra note 168, at 3; Tamar-Mattis, ENDOCRINE TODAY, supra
note 204 (noting that some doctors think that surgery is necessary to assign a legal sex).
207. See Froukje M.E. Slijper et al., Long-Term Psychological Evaluation of Intersex
Children, 27 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 125, 134-36 (1998) (reporting that thirteen
percent of the individuals interviewed in one study later developed a sexual identity at
odds with the surgical designation).
208. See Susan J. Bradley et al., Experiment of Nurture: Ablatio Penis at 2 Months, Sex
Reassignment at 7 Months, and a Psychosexual Follow-up in Young Adulthood, 102
PEDIATRICS e9, el0 (1998) (reporting on a case where infant was reassigned to female sex
following injury during circumcision). The existence of these practices was made more
visible by the publication of John Colapinto's book on the story of David Reimer.
COLAPINTO, supra note 32, passim. Reimer suffered a traumatic injury to his penis during
a botched circumcision in infancy. Id. at xiii. On the advice of medical experts, Reimer's
parents decided that the appropriate course of action was to reconstruct Reimer as a girl.
Id. Over the next several years, Reimer underwent several surgeries to remove his testes
and what remained of his penis. Id. Somewhat later, he took estrogen and grew breasts. Id.
at 129. Reimer suffered severe psychological problems, however, and ultimately decided
to become a male again, at the age of fourteen. Id. at 274. Some time later, he committed
suicide. John Colapinto, Gender Gap: What Were the Real Reasons Behind David Reimer's
Suicide?, SLATE, June 3, 2004, http://www.slate.com/id/2101678/.
209. See Spade, supra note 22, at 16-17. The binary regime also does not make space
(in tort litigation or elsewhere) for those who wish to live outside it. See id. at 17-18
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This can be seen in cases like Littleton but also in cases that have
not been brought. Sex assignment or reassignment surgery on
children is almost never medically necessary. 210 It is typically
performed to alleviate the anxiety of parents and to prevent assumed
psychological harm to children who may perceive themselves as
different. 2 ' But, in fact, there is little evidence that the benefits of the
surgery outweigh the risks. Because of this, there is a growing
specter of potential litigation against the surgeons who perform the
surgery.2 3
At the moment, however, such litigation would likely be
precluded by legal doctrines in U.S. tort law that protect doctors from
liability when the medical procedures are consistent with the custom
of the profession and where they have obtained the patient's
consent.2 4 In other jurisdictions, however, courts have challenged
doctors who have performed, or are attempting to perform, similar
operations. In 1995, the Constitutional Court of Colombia
(Colombia's highest court) heard the claims of a young Colombian
man who sued his doctors after they performed a surgical sex
reassignment on him as an infant, following a traumatic injury to his
penis.215 In a precedent-setting ruling, the Colombian court held that
the doctor should not have performed the surgery' even though the
parents consented.216 Instead, the court found decisions about surgery
should, in most instances, be delayed until the child has an
(discussing the legal challenges of post-operative transgendered people with regards to
providing evidence of their sex change).
210. See Kate Haas, Who Will Make Room for the Intersexed, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 41,
42 (2004).
211. See id.; see also Lee et al., supra note 84, at e491 ("Initial gender uncertainty is
unsettling and stressful for families.").
212. Beh & Diamond, An Emerging Ethical and Medical Dilemma, supra note 205, at
21-27. Among other things, the surgeries pose risks of sexual dysfunction. Id. at 21.
213. See Greenberg, Legal Aspects of Gender Assignment, supra note 40, at 277 ("[T]he
current dominant treatment protocol may impair the legal rights of the intersex child as
well as lead to legal liability for the treating physicians.").
214. Tim Cramm et al., Ascertaining Customary Care in Malpractice Cases: Asking
Those Who Know, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 699, 703-04 (2002). In most instances, a
defendant's compliance with professional custom (i.e., what other doctors do) provides a
complete defense to a claim for medical malpractice in the United States. See id. at 705.
Parental consent doctrines provide similar protection. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R, 442 U.S.
584, 604 (1979) (according great deference to parental medical decisions).
215. Sentencia No. T-477/95 (Corte Constitucional, 1995) (Colom.), available at
http://www.isna.org/node/110. For an English summary of this case and subsequent related
rulings from the Colombian court, see Haas, supra note 210, at 49-54.
216. Sentencia No. T-477/95.
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opportunity to comprehend the nature of the surgery and give
meaningful consent.217
The Colombian court's reasoning sheds light on how the U.S.
doctrines of informed consent and professional custom in medical
malpractice cases prevent U.S. courts from seriously considering the
issues that are raised by such cases. In the Colombian case, the court
questioned the cultural expectations that were at the heart of the
decision to subject the Colombian child to surgery in the first place.218
Specifically, the court noted that the surgery might have been
motivated by societal intolerance of bodies that do not live up to
cultural expectations about binary sexual difference. 219 And, if that
were the case, the court reasoned, it would constitute discrimination
for the court to place its imprimatur on this intolerance by allowing
the practices to go unchallenged.22 °
Cases raising similar issues have also been brought in Australia,
with similar results. 221 As a result, a court order may now be necessary
before a physician may perform sex reassignment surgery in
Australia.22
United States courts, in contrast, have not challenged similar
practices in tort litigation. Although no cases have been brought, it is
generally expected that courts would defer to the opinions of doctors
and parents.223 This deference is facilitated by legal doctrines which




220. Id. This reasoning led the Colombian court to rule in favor of the individual who
had already undergone such surgery and to conclude that the consent given by his parents
was insufficient. Id. In two other cases, the Constitutional Court of Colombia subsequently
employed the same reasoning to issue rulings restricting the ability of parents to consent
and doctors to perform the surgeries. See Sentencia No. Su-337/99 (Corte Constitucional,
1999) (Colom.), available at http://www.isna.org/node/166; Sentencia No. T-551/99 (Corte
Constitucional, 1995) (Colom.) available at http://www.isna.org/node/126.
221. See Lily Bragge, Choosing the Right Gender, THE AGE (Austl.), Feb. 1, 2005, at
A3, available at http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2005/01/31/1107020318710.html
(describing the case of Tony Briffa, who is attempting to sue his doctors for medical
malpractice in surgically reassigning him as female at age seven).
222. In re A (A Child) (1993) 16 Fain. L. R. 715, 715-16 (Austl.) (requiring a court
order to reassign a child to a different sex in a case involving genital injury after birth).
223. See Lee et al., supra note 84, at e497 (explaining in a special appendix on "legal
issues" that the medical profession sets standards of care "on the basis of prevailing
custom" and that "US courts assume that parents know what is best for their child"); see
also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-04 (1979) (according great deference to parental
medical decisions); Cramm et al., supra note 214, at 703-04 (explaining professional
custom standard in medical malpractice cases).
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doctor who has performed surgery on a child.224 Under the
professional custom standard that is employed in most medical
malpractice cases in the United States, for example, a plaintiff must
show that a doctor's actions have deviated from the actions that are
customary among other doctors in the field.225
This deference to professional custom in medical malpractice
cases is a departure from how custom is treated in other negligence
actions, where custom typically is relevant but provides no protection
from liability.226 Doctors are treated differently because it is assumed
that the medical profession is so complex that the average juror does
not have the knowledge to determine what is objectively
reasonable. 227 As a practical matter, the doctrine operates to preclude
a plaintiff from bringing a medical malpractice action in the United
States, unless a doctor is willing to testify that the defendant's actions
violated the customs of the medical profession.228 In the intersex
surgery context, it would be extremely difficult for a plaintiff to be
able to find a doctor to testify to this because medical protocols
clearly identify surgery as a customary "treatment" for intersex
children.
The parental consent doctrine effectively precludes judicial
review for similar reasons. Judicial deference is defended on the
ground that parents are more appropriate decision-makers for their
children than courts because parents know their children better than
judges and can, in most instances, be trusted to make more
appropriate judgments about medical treatments for them.2 29 In other
contexts, courts have the authority to intervene and prevent a parent
from consenting to surgery for their children if the court determines
224. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 32, at 186-89, § 33, at 193-96 (5th ed. 1984) (explaining how the professional custom
standard of care for medical negligence allows physicians to set their own standards of
conduct). Some U.S. courts have abandoned the professional custom standard for a
"reasonable physician" test. See, e.g., Vassos v. Roussalis, 625 P.2d 768, 772 (Wyo. 1981)
(holding that the standard of care for malpractice cases is that a physician must exercise
the care that would reasonably be exercised under similar circumstances by members of
the profession in good standing and in the same line of practice).
225. See Cramm et al., supra note 214, at 703-04.
226. KEETON ET AL., supra note 224, § 33, at 193-96.
227. Cramm et al., supra note 214, at 703--04. A second argument for treating doctors
differently is the presumption that, as professionals, they will also place the patient's
welfare first. Id. at 703.
228. KEETON ET AL., supra note 224, § 32, at 188.
229. See Beh & Diamond, An Emerging Ethical and Medical Dilemma, supra note 205,
at 38-39.
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that it is not in the child's best interest.230 When the parents' interests
are seen as conflicting with those of the child, for example, courts
sometimes step in and limit the parents' authority to make medical
decisions for the child.231 But there is no indication yet that courts will
take this approach in cases involving intersex children. 32
In sum, both legal doctrines (professional custom and parental
consent) encourage courts to defer to the practices of doctors and
parental preferences in this context. 233 As the Constitutional Court of
Colombia noted, however, the views of doctors and parents are
heavily influenced by cultural intolerance of sexual identities that fall
outside a binary classification.2 ' For the Colombian court, it was
important to respond to this intolerance with a legal stance that
actively interrogated the assumptions underlying this cultural
intolerance. United States courts, in contrast, incorporate this
intolerance into their legal decision-making.
A slander case involving an allegation of intersexuality makes
this point in a particularly graphic way.235 After concluding that it is
230. See, e.g., Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (overruling parental
consent to skin removal and other treatments to assist burned cousin); see also In re
Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185, 187 (La. Ct. App. 1973) (declining to approve parental
consent to child's participation in organ donation procedure); In re Guardianship of
Pescinski, 226 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Wis. 1975) (same). This authority to second guess parental
judgment, however, is often exercised to require surgery over parental objection, rather
than to prevent it. See, e.g., In re Sampson, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1970)
(ordering surgery over parental objection). Some states also prohibit sterilization of
mentally disabled children without court approval by statute. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE
§ 1958 (West 2002). Secondary sterilizations, such as those caused by sex assignment
surgery on intersex infants, however, are generally not prohibited. See, e.g., § 1968.
231. See, e.g., In re AW., 637 P.2d 366, 370 (Colo. 1981) (holding that parents may not
consent to the sterilization of mentally disabled children); In re McCauley, 565 N.E.2d 411,
413 (Mass. 1991) (overruling parental decision to deny medical treatment based on
religious beliefs).
232. Anne Tamar-Mattis, Exceptions to the Rule: Curing the Law's Failure to Protect
Intersex Infants, 21 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 59, 80-81 (2006) [hereinafter
Tamar-Mattis, Exceptions to the Rule]. But see id at 107-08 (suggesting ways to authorize
judicial involvement in genital-normalizing surgery, such as by enacting a statute or, more
plausibly, having doctors take the initiative by bringing this issue before the courts); Hazel
Glenn Beh & Milton Diamond, David Reimer's Legacy: Limiting Parental Discretion, 12
CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 5, 21-27 (2005) [hereinafter Beh & Diamond, David Reimer's
Legacy] (arguing against deferring to parental consent in the context of surgery on
intersex children).
233. Sara A. Aliabadi, Note, You Make Me Feel Like a Natural Woman: Allowing
Parents to Consent to Early Gender Assignment Surgeries for Their Intersexed Infants, 11
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 427,454-56 (2005).
234. Sentencia No. T-477/95 (Corte Constitucional, 1995) (Colom.), available at
http://www.isna.orglnodel110.
235. See Malone v. Stewart, 15 Ohio 319, 319 (1846) (in bank) (involving allegations
that Stewart had falsely referred to Malone as a "hermaphrodite").
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slander per se to falsely accuse someone of being intersexed, the court
explained that making such an allegation "unsexes" the victim and
"converts her into a monster, whose very existence is shocking to
nature.''236 As a result, the court concluded, damage to plaintiff's
reputation could be presumed.237
An allegation of intersexuality only "unsexes" an individual,
however, if the court assumes that there is no possibility of sexual
identity outside of a binary classification. Similarly, the existence of
intersexed people is only "shocking" because of the court's own
presumptions about the binary sexual qualities of "nature." To
incorporate these views into legal opinions affecting the availability of
tort remedies displays how tort cases incorporate cultural intolerance
into tort law itself. It also shows how tort litigation indirectly sends a
message that sexual identity is, or should be, binary.238
III. SEXUAL IDENTITY NARRATIVES IN TORT LITIGATION
INFLUENCE DEBATES OUTSIDE THE COURTROOM
When the Littleton court insisted that Christie Littleton was not a
female in the face of uncontroverted physical evidence which
suggested otherwise, it allowed the court to exclude Littleton and
others from exercising important legal rights and remedies, including
wrongful death claims for the negligent loss of a spouse.239 Although
the decision focused on the claim of a post-operative transsexual, the
legal and political implications of Littleton go well beyond the denial
of the benefits of tort litigation to post-operative transsexuals who
marry someone with the same designated birth sex. Under the court's
logic, intersex individuals, and virtually anyone whose current sexual
identity is not the same as the one that appears on their original birth
certificate, are not viable legal subjects for purposes of marriage or
236. Id. at 320.
237. Id.
238. See Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. App. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S.
872 (2000). The protection that tort litigation provides to doctors who perform sex
assignment and sex reassignment surgeries might also be viewed as evidence of the courts'
tacit recognition in these (unfiled) cases that sexual identity is indeed mutable. See Melvin
M. Belli, Transexual Surgery: A New Tort?, 239 JAMA 2143, 2145 (1978). But the
approach in these cases more closely resembles that of courts in the breast implant
litigation, where the surgery is viewed as "corrective" in the sense of restoring the body to
its natural state or, in some instances, constructing a natural state that the body should
have had. Id. at 2146. Alternatively, the seeming tolerance of mutability in this instance
may also reflect a more general sensibility that preserving a notion of sexual identity as
naturally binary is more important than conveying its immutability.
239. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 231.
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making marriage-related tort claims.24 ° Much more broadly, the
court's ruling provides political and cultural legitimacy for views that
are advocated outside the courthouse doors.
An example of this can be seen in how the legal narratives of the
Littleton case provided political legitimacy to opponents of same-sex
marriage. Not long after Littleton, Texas newspapers reported on an
attempt by two lesbians, one of whom was a male-to-female
transsexual, to marry.241 Somewhat surprisingly, the president of the
Texas Conservative Coalition, which ordinarily opposes same-sex
marriage, did not oppose the marriage. 242 As he explained, this was
because (under Littleton) the lesbians were "legally a man and a
woman.243
This direct use of a legal narrative to justify a political decision is
a classic example of how law can shape political and cultural debates
surrounding sexual identity in important ways. As this example
illustrates, the legal narrative in Littleton shaped the political
consciousness of an anti-gay marriage activist by providing legitimacy
for a position that seemed to be at odds with his organization's typical
stance on these issues.2" Specifically, the legal ruling in Littleton
seems to have played a role in constructing this individual's views
about what constitutes a "real" man and "real" woman for purposes
of heterosexual marriage.245
More broadly, the example illustrates how law plays a role in
constructing social meaning. Especially in the context of sexual
identity, we expect law to reflect and enforce other cultural
narratives. But law does more. Legal narratives do not simply reflect
240. See id. at 225-26. The Littletons were able to marry because Christie Littleton had
successfully changed her birth certificate following her surgery. Id. When Christie
Littleton later attempted to rely on this change in her birth certificate, however, the court
focused on what the birth certificate said at the time of birth, rather than its current
designation. Id. at 231. For further discussion of the Littletons' marriage, see supra notes
85-101 and accompanying text.
241. See Rick Casey, Column, I Now Pronounce You Wife and Wife, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS NEWS, Aug. 30, 2000, at 3A; Polly Ross Hughes, Lesbians' Plans to Wed Look
Legal, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 31, 2000, at 1A.
242. The political agenda of the Texas Conservation Coalition can be found on their
Web site: http://www.txcc.org. This agenda includes opposition to same-sex marriage. See
Tex. Conservative Coal., Traditional Values, http://www.txcc.org/content/traditional-
values-0 (last visited Jan. 2, 2010). Currently, for example, the Web site lists passage of a
Senate Bill opposing same-sex civil unions as a "victory." See id.
243. Michelle Kurtz, Lesbian Wedding Allowed in Texas by Gender Loophole,
SEATLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 7, 2000, at A3.
244. See Hughes, supra note 241; Kurtz, supra note 243.
245. See id.
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the culture of which they are a part.246 Like other cultural narratives,
legal rulings shape our perceptions of political and cultural reality.247
In the context of sexual identity, this means that legal narratives
influence and, indeed, help to construct, our beliefs about what it
means to be "real" for purposes of sexual identity.248
Legal rulings are, of course, not the only narratives playing this
role. Our beliefs about sexual identity are organized and shaped by a
variety of narratives, including, importantly, the narratives that are
produced by medical and scientific experts. Because of its focus on
the body, however, narratives in tort litigation may play a particularly
influential role in shaping broader social discourses about sexual
identity.249
The remainder of this Part looks at how tort litigation influences
broader cultural narratives in two particular areas: (A) the nature of
marriage, including same-sex marriage; and (B) the nature of binary
sexual identity.
246. See IAN HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE
87 (10th ed. 2006) ("Law thus defines, while seeming only to reflect, a host of social
relations."); see also David M. Engel & Michael McCann, Introduction, in FAULT LINES
supra note 200, at 1, 1 ("[T]ort law plays a role in constituting the very cultural fabric in
which it is embedded."). This is particularly easy to see in areas of the law, like tort
litigation, which rely on the common law as their primary authority. In common law cases,
the judge cites and repeats the dominant narrative, as precedent, in each decision. This
citation of the dominant narrative then both produces the law and establishes the priority
of certain cultural and legal norms. BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER, supra note 17, at
225. In doing so, the legal narratives in the case inevitably play a role in the structuring of
social relations by privileging certain narratives over others. LOPEZ, supra, at 86 ("[L]aw is
not limited to direct, coercive, behavior-controlling means .... It also operates on the
level of constitutive ideology.").
247. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE
ANTHROPOLOGY 184 (1983). Clifford Geertz referred to this relationship between
narratives and political consciousness as the role of discourse in "imagining the real." Id.;
see also SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND GETTING EVEN: LEGAL
CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG WORKING CLASS AMERICANS 9 (1990) (discussing the
increasing "flow of influence outward from the courts" to the general population).
248. See ALAN HUNT, EXPLORATIONS IN LAW AND SOCIETY: TOWARDS A
CONSTITUTIVE THEORY OF LAW 316 (1993) (arguing that law helps to construct the
objects which it seeks to regulate); Marc Galanter, The Radiating Effects of Courts, in
EMPIRICAL THEORIES ABOUT COURTS 117, 118 (Keith 0. Boyum & Lynn Mather eds.,
1983).
249. See SARAH S. LOCHLANN JAIN, INJURY: THE POLITICS OF PRODUCT DESIGN
AND SAFETY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 7 (2006). As Jain notes, injury laws "including
their human (lawyers, plaintiffs, judges, clerks) and nonhuman participants (amicus briefs,
complaints, texts, restatements)-are key actors in the cultural reproduction of material
difference." Id.
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A. How Legal Narratives About Sexual Identity in Tort Litigation
Influence Views About Marriage
As we have already seen, court decisions like Littleton play into
broader debates about same-sex marriage. For the Littleton court,
Christie and Jonathan Littleton did not have a "real" marriage
because, in the court's view, Christie Littleton did not qualify as a
"real" woman.2"° Texas is not alone in this conclusion. Other
jurisdictions have also refused to recognize marriages between
transsexuals and individuals with the same designated sex at birth."'
Because of this, post-operative transsexuals who seek to marry an
individual who shares the same designated sex at birth will not only
be denied the right to marry but will also be denied the right to
pursue marriage-related tort litigation.
At least one jurisdiction in the United States, however, has
explicitly recognized the right of a post-operative transsexual to
marry an individual of the same designated birth sex. 2 And in many
other jurisdictions, post-operative transsexuals are permitted to
change the designation of their birth sex by statute. 3 In these
jurisdictions, it would seem that post-operative transsexuals could
250. See Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. App. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S.
872 (2000).
251. See In re Estate of Gardiner (Gardiner H), 42 P.3d 120, 137 (Kan. 2002); Gajovski
v. Gajovski, 610 N.E.2d 431, 433 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991); In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828, 832
(Ohio Prob. Ct. 1987); see also Corbett v. Corbett, [1971] P 108 (Eng. 1970) (invalidating
marriage between a post-operative transsexual and an individual of the same designated
birth sex). See generally Helen G. Berrigan, Transsexual Marriage: A Trans-Atlantic
Judicial Dialogue, 12 LAW & SEXUALITY REV. 87 (2003) (discussing how American courts
have used the Corbett decision to declare that gender is determined solely by
chromosomes and that marriage is determined by sexual intercourse).
252. See M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 211 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976), cert. denied,
364 A.2d 1076 (N.J. 1976); see also Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 7,
34-35 (upholding the right of transsexuals to marry); Kevin v. Attorney-General (2001)
165 F.L.R. 404, 476 (Austl.) (same).
253. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-9A-19(d) (LexisNexis 2006); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 36-337(A)(3) (2009); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-307(d) (2005); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE §§ 103425-103430 (West 2006 & Supp. 2009); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-2-115(4)
(2008); D.C. CODE § 7-217(d) (2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-10-23(e) (2009); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 338-17.7(4)(B) (1993); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 535/17-1(d) (West 2005 &
Supp. 2009); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144.23 (West 2005), amended by Act of Apr. 29, 2005,
ch. 89, § 12, 2005 Iowa Acts 249; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:62 (2001); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 46, § 13 (LexisNexis Supp. 2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.2831 (West 2001);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-57-21 (West 2007); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 193.215 (West 2004); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 71-604.01 (Supp. 2008), amended by Act of May 22, 2009, LB 195, § 67, 2009
Neb. Laws _; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8-40.12 (West 2007); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-14-25
(West 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-118 (2007); OR. REV. STAT. § 432.235 (2007);
UTAH CODE ANN. 26-2-11 (2007); VA. CODE. ANN. § 32.1-269 (2009); WIS. STAT. § 69.15
(2002).
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pursue tort litigation arising out of a marriage relationship with a
person who shares the same designated sex at birth.
As Littleton illustrates, however, marriage per se is not always
sufficient for purposes of recognizing marriage-related tort claims.25 4
In Littleton, Christie Littleton's birth certificate had been changed to
reflect her post-operative sexual identity as a female.215 This evidence
was deemed sufficient by Texas authorities to permit her to enter into
a marriage with her husband, but insufficient for purposes of pursuing
tort-related legal claims, such as wrongful death and survivor claims,
on his and her behalf.25 6
This result suggests that, for the Littleton court, and perhaps
other courts as well, marriage involves something more than legal
proof that the parties are legally designated as oppositely sexed.
Because of this, the legal ruling plays into a much broader set of
narratives about marriage. These narratives go far beyond a simple
opposition to same-sex marriage and embrace an understanding
about marriage that involves a particular type of sexual activity and
the production of offspring.
As noted above, the court's ruling in Littleton employed
presumptions about sexual identity that would exclude not only post-
operative transsexuals but intersex individuals and others whose
current sexual identity is not the same as the one that appears on
their original birth certificate from pursuing wrongful death and other
marriage-related tort claims.257  Other courts reaching similar
conclusions in cases involving post-operative transsexuals have
employed presumptions about sexual identity that exclude even more
people by linking binary sexual identity closely with reproductive
capacity.258
The Kansas Supreme Court, for example, instructed trial courts
that a " 'male' is defined as 'designating or of the sex that fertilizes
the ovum and begets offspring' " and " 'female' is defined as
254. See Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 231. The Littletons were able to marry because Christie
Littleton had successfully changed her birth certificate following her surgery. Id. When
Christie Littleton later attempted to rely on this change in her birth certificate, however,
the court focused on what the birth certificate said at the time of birth, rather than its
current designation. Id.; see also supra Part I.A. (discussing the Littleton's ability to
marry).
255. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 231.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. See, e.g., In re Estate of Gardiner (Gardiner II), 42 P.3d 120, 135 (Kan. 2002).
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'designating or of the sex that produces ova and bears offspring.' "259
Under these definitions, a male-to-female post-operative transsexual
cannot qualify as a female because the "ability to 'produce ova and
bear offspring' does not and never did exist."'2" But the definitions
employed by the court exclude many more people than post-
operative transsexuals from the benefits of the law. If we take the
court seriously, individuals who cannot fertilize an ovum or ovulate
do not qualify as either male or female and are also precluded from
enjoying any of the legal rights and benefits associated with
heterosexual marriage, including obtaining remedies for the wrongful
death of a spouse.
This seems like a preposterous conclusion except for the fact that
it echoes earlier legal rulings, and broader cultural discourses, about
marriage. Many opponents of same-sex marriage, for example, justify
their opposition on the ground that marriage exists primarily for
sexual relations related to producing children.26' Case law and
statutory provisions echo this sentiment.262 Similarly, an incapacity for
heterosexual intercourse is often grounds for annulment.263 According
to these narratives, marriage involves not only opposing binary
identities but also a particular type of sexual activity with the goal of
reproduction.
When courts, like the one in Littleton and the Kansas Supreme
Court, define binary sexual identity in terms of the ability to produce
ova and bear offspring, they reinforce and provide legitimacy for
these particular marriage narratives. And, in doing so, they influence
how we conceptualize what a "real" marriage should look like. The
259. Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY 674, 1090 (2d
ed. 1970)).
260. Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY 674, 1090 (2d
ed. 1970)).
261. See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, "Multiply and Replenish": Considering Same-Sex
Marriage in Light of State Interests in Marital Procreation, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
771, 796-99 (2001) (arguing against same-sex marriage on procreation grounds); see also
Deborah A. Widiss, Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt & Douglas NeJaime, Exposing Same Sex
Stereotypes in Recent Same-Sex Marriage Jurisprudence, 20 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 462,
489-92 (2007) (describing how procreation and related arguments have played a role in
same-sex marriage debates).
262. See, e.g., Melia v. Melia, 226 A.2d 745, 747 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967) ("First
among [the purposes of marriage] is procreation of the human race."); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3105.31(F) (LexisNexis 2008) (listing failure to consummate a marriage as grounds
for annulment).
263. See, e.g., Singer v. Singer, 74 A.2d 622, 624 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1950)
(granting an annulment where wife's vagina was too small to permit full penetration of her
husband's penis); see also 4 AM. JUR. 2D Annulment of Marriage § 27 (2007) (stating that
physical inability to have sexual intercourse can be grounds for annulment).
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implications of this are quite clear for debates over same-sex
marriage. Since such marriages are not typically characterized by
sexual activity aimed at reproduction, same-sex marriage cannot,
under this logic, ever qualify as a "real" marriage.26 But the logic
would also seem to exclude post-menopausal women, impotent men,
and any number of other individuals who either lack reproductive
capacity or are otherwise uninterested in sexual activities aimed at
reproduction.
B. How Legal Narratives About Sexual Identity in Tort Litigation
Influence Views About Sexual Identity
Legal narratives also influence narratives about sexual identity.265
Legal narratives in tort litigation, for example, provide important
cues about what sexual identity should look like.266 These cues, in
turn, influence how doctors, litigants, and others define what is "real"
in the realm of sexual identity and, more precisely, how they believe
sexual identity should (or must) be categorized. The legal rulings in
the Brandon and Hall cases, for example, likely influenced how the
surrounding community viewed the "realness" of the sexual identities
of the individuals involved. In the Brandon case, this influence was
likely magnified by the fact that the case became the subject of a
major motion picture.
Perhaps the most compelling (and disturbing) illustration of how
legal narratives may influence how we think about sexual identity,
however, is in the relationship between medical protocols for intersex
children and tort doctrines. In this relationship, tort doctrines appear
to defer to medical expertise in this area but, in fact, reinforce cultural
expectations about sexual identity.267
Under the terms of this collaboration, doctors develop medical
protocols in response to legal demands for binary sexual identity. The
264. See Wardle, supra note 261, at 780-81; see also Anderson v. King County, 138 P.3d
963, 1002 (Wash. 2006) (Johnson, J., concurring) (citing the state's interest in procreation
in support of limitation on marriage to different sex couples).
265. See Bloom, supra note 25, at 90-91 (describing how the breast implant litigation
worked to construct cultural norms about what breasts should look like). For further
discussion of the manner in which legal narratives influence the image of sexual identity,
see supra Part II.
266. See Bloom, supra note 25, at 90-91.
267. See LEVIT, supra note 53, at 3. The relationship between tort litigation and
medicine in this area is characteristic of a broader collaboration between law and science,
which operates to enforce dominant cultural narratives about binary sexual identity. See
id. ("Law collaborates with other institutions in the creation and maintenance of gender
differences, constructing and legitimizing both the separation of the sexes and the
conception of gender in naturalistic terms.").
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law then provides doctors with protection from liability for the
surgeries and other treatments that they employ to perfect binary
classifications on bodies that do not fully comply with the
expectations of binary sexual difference. 68
In other words, medicine has created binary sexual identities, in
part, because law has demanded it. Law, in turn, provides protection
for these medical practices. This sub-Part illustrates this collaboration
by looking more closely at how medical protocols for intersex
children work in conjunction with the practices of tort litigation to
both encourage and provide protection for medical practices aimed at
perfecting binary sexual identity on intersex children. It also takes a
second look at the breast implant litigation to show how that
litigation also served to reinforce dominant cultural narratives about
the "nature" of binary sexual identity. Finally, it reflects more broadly
on the role that science plays in tort litigation.
1. How Law Shapes Medical Protocols for Intersex Children
Medical protocols for intersex infants have undergone significant
change in the last decade. Until a few years ago, the American
Academy of Pediatricians guidelines described the birth of an
intersex infant as a "social emergency," requiring immediate medical
attention.269 More recently adopted protocols abandoned the "social
emergency" language but still emphasize the psychological
significance of the event and the need to act quickly to provide the
child with a binary sex classification as soon as possible.27 °
The theory underlying this approach embodies two fundamental
principles. The first principle is that it is essential to designate all
babies as either "male" or "female" as quickly as possible.2 1' The
second is that children cannot develop "proper gender identity"
unless their bodies exhibit traits that "validate" or "affirm" their
designated biological sex.272
268. See Tamar-Mattis, Exceptions to the Rule, supra note 232, at 81-84 (describing
generally the authority of doctors to set the standard of care in cases involving intersex
infants and criticizing that authority).
269. Am. Acad. Pediatrics, supra note 204, at 138.
270. Lee et al., supra note 84, at e491 ("Expediting a thorough assessment and decision
is required."). Moreover, although the guidelines acknowledge that intersex status rarely
poses any risks to the child's physical health, it is still described as a "disorder." Id. at e488.
271. See Thyen et al., supra note 168, at 3 ("Following delivery of a newborn with
ambiguous genitalia, parents as well as health professionals feel that assignment to the
male or female sex must be determined as soon as possible."); see also Chi et al., supra
note 205, at e82 ("The assessment and treatment of newborns who have ambiguous
genitalia requires urgency and sensitivity.").
272. LEVIT, supra note 53, at 240.
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Medical protocols on the appropriateness of transsexual surgery
for adults follow essentially the same principles.2 173 For adults,
however, the assumption is that the individuals have already
developed a "proper gender identity" and need surgery to help their
bodies comply. 24 Because of this, sex reassignment surgery is
recommended for adults only when the individual has a demonstrated
history of identifying clearly as either a male or female. 275 Individuals
who espouse a more ambiguous sexual identity do not qualify.27 6
In short, medical protocols currently operate on the assumption
that sexual identity is, or perhaps should be, binary.277 Because
ambiguous genitalia usually pose no physical health risk to the child,
protocols which require a binary classification to be made as quickly
as possible are increasingly defended on cultural and related
psychological grounds.278 As one bioethicist summarized the situation,
the problem is that "a physician cannot, in good conscience, assure"
that our "present sex and gender systems [will] make space for those
who do not conform to the present norms., 279
For many physicians, one of the key sex and gender systems that
will not "make space for those who do not conform to present norms"
is the law.28° A recent medical article cites an early legal case to
illustrate the dilemma:
The law depends upon precise definitions and is obliged to
classify its material into exclusive categories. It is a binary
system designed to produce conclusions of the yes or no type.
273. THE HARRY BENJAMIN INT'L GENDER DYSPHORIA ASS'N, supra note 104, at 9.
274. Id. at 20.
275. Id.
276. See Spade, supra note 22, passim.
277. See Thyen, supra note 168, at 3; see also Tamar-Mattis, ENDOCRINE TODAY,
supra note 204 ("Some [doctors] seem to think that surgery in cases of genital ambiguity is
necessary in order to assign a legal sex."). This view is adopted even by those experts who
counsel against early surgery on infants. See, e.g., Milton Diamond, Biased-Interaction
Theory of Psychosexual Development: "How Does One Know if One Is Male or Female?",
55 SEX ROLES 589, 596 (2006) ("[Sex should be declared] based on the most likely
outcome.").
278. See Aliabadi, supra note 233, at 447-48 (noting the "dubious scientific foundation"
for current medical protocols but defending current approaches as less risky culturally).
279. Laura Hermer, Paradigms Revised: Intersex Children, Bioethics & the Law, 11
ANNALS HEALTH L. 195, 228 (2002).
280. Id.; see also Dasarai Harish & B.R. Sharma., Medical Advances in Transsexualism
and the Legal Implications, 24 AM. J. FORENSIC MED. & PATHOLOGY 100, 103-04 (2003)
(describing the legal aspects of gender re-assignment procedures for a transsexual from a
physician's perspective); Tamar-Mattis, ENDOCRINE TODAY, supra note 204 (quoting a
surgeon who believed that sex assignment surgery was necessary to assign a legal sex to a
child).
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Biologic phenomenon, however, cannot be reduced to exclusive
categories so that medicine often cannot give yes or no
answers.
281
Doctors, in other words, do not themselves believe that sexual
identity "can be reduced to exclusive [binary] categories. ' 2 2 They do,
however, perceive the legal system as requiring such classifications.283
Along with cultural expectations, this legal requirement for binary
classification provides the core justification for contemporary medical
protocols which require intersex infants to be classified as male or
female as quickly as possible and authorize surgery as a means of
perfecting the categorization.2 4
As compared to even five years ago, however, doctors are
increasingly reluctant to perform sex assignment (or reassignment)
surgery on children.285 There are two reasons for this. One is the
rulings of Colombian and Australian courts holding that surgeons
may not perform these surgeries until the child is old enough to give
"meaningful consent." 6 Although courts in the United States have
yet to follow this approach, the decisions sent shockwaves through
the medical community, and many doctors are now concerned about
the possibility of medical malpractice liability for performing sex
assignment or reassignment surgery on infants.287
281. Harish & Sharma, supra note 280, at 104 (quoting Roger Ormrod, The Medico-
legal Aspects of Sex Determination, 40 MEDICO-LEGAL J. 78, 78 (1972)) (Harish and
Sharma misquote Ormrod, though the substance of the quotation is accurate.) Ormrod,
who wrote the opinion in Corbett v. Corbett, [1971] P. 83 (Eng. 1970), discussed that
decision in his later article on the subject of that lawsuit. See Roger Ormrod, The Medico-
legal Aspects of Sex Determination, 40 MEDICO-LEGAL J. 78, 85 (1972).
282. Harish & Sharma, supra note 280, at 104.
283. See id. at 103-04.
284. See Am. Acad. Pediatrics, supra note 204, at 138 (emphasizing the social aspects of
gender assignment surgery); see also id. at 142 ("[The] diagnosis and prompt treatment [of
newborns with ambiguous genitalia] require[s] urgent medical attention. It is important to
arrive at a definitive diagnosis so that an appropriate treatment plan can be
developed ...").
285. See, e.g., Paul McHugh, Surgical Sex, 147 FIRST THINGS 34, 37 (2004). For
example, Johns Hopkins Hospital, the first hospital in the nation to perform sex change
operations, no longer performs them. See id. (explaining why Hopkins stopped performing
the surgeries).
286. See In re A (A Child) (1993) 16 Fam. L. R. 715, 715-16 (Austl.); Sentencia No. T-
477/95 (Corte Constitucional, 1995) (Colom.), available at http://www.isna.org/node/110;
see also Beh & Diamond, David Reimer's Legacy, supra note 232, at 25-28 (discussing the
Colombian and Australian cases).
287. See Lee et al., supra note 84, at e497 (discussing, in an appendix on "Legal Issues,"
the position taken in the Colombian case on surgery on infants); see also Greenberg, Legal
Aspects of Gender Assignment, supra note 40, at 282 (noting that recent developments
may pose future liability risks for surgeons).
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A second, related, reason for doctors' concern is the growing
criticism within the medical community of the surgical practices. 88
The main critique is that there is little to no evidence to support the
claim that the psychological benefits of the surgeries outweigh the
substantial risk of harm that the surgeries pose (among other things,
the surgeries pose risks of sexual dysfunction, such as loss of
sensation). 289 As these critics note, intersex individuals "can have
satisfying and rewarding lives without surgical alteration. 290
The internal critiques of the surgeries within the medical
profession have made many doctors more concerned about
performing sex assignment surgery.29 1 This is because a doctor's
defense to a medical malpractice claim depends upon her ability to
show that the treatments were consistent with professional custom. 9
2
If enough doctors no longer consider the surgery wise, then the
custom will effectively change, potentially subjecting doctors who
continue to perform the surgery to the prospect of liability.
At the moment, most physicians appear to be deferring to
parents.293 The view is that, despite the risks, surgery is still the better
choice, "[i]f parents maintain a strong prejudice in favor of surgery
despite a complete education about its potential risks. ' 294 Post-
treatment studies suggest that physicians also have a strong influence
on parental consent in this context.
288. Beh & Diamond, An Emerging Ethical and Medical Dilemma, supra note 205, at
23-27.
289. Id.
290. Beh & Diamond, David Reimer's Legacy, supra note 232, at 23.
291. Beh & Diamond, An Emerging Ethical and Medical Dilemma, supra note 205, at
23-27; see also McHugh, supra note 285, at 37 (explaining that Johns Hopkins stopped
performing sex assignment surgeries because a child's genetic makeup dictates how his or
her hormones contribute to growth and assigning a sex different from what a child's
hormones dictate disrupts sexual identity development).
292. KEETON ET AL., supra note 224, § 32, at 189.
293. See Tamar-Mattis, Exceptions to the Rule, supra note 232, at 78-79 (describing the
current process of decision-making for intersex children).
294. Erica A. Eugster, Reality v. Recommendations in the Care of Infants with Intersex
Conditions, 158 ARCHIVES PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT MED. 426, 429 (2004).
295. Alice Domurat Dreger, "Ambiguous Sex"-or Ambivalent Medicine?: Ethical
Issues in the Treatment of Intersexuality, HASTINGS CTR. REP., May-Jun. 1998, at 24, 33.
The well-known story of David Reimer illustrates this quite well. Reimer's parents
followed the recommendations of expert John Money to surgically and socially reassign
David as a female, almost without question. COLAPINTO, supra note 32, at 50 (noting that
Reimer's mother looked up to the expert "like a god"). Studies also show that when
parents did not ask for detailed information, doctors did not volunteer it. Dreger, supra, at
33. As Alice Dreger has noted, "ethical guidelines that would be applied in nearly any
other medical intervention are, in cases of intersexuality, ignored." Id. In recent years,
some experts have begun to call for more informed consent to sex assignment and
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From a legal perspective, deferring to parental consent provides
doctors with significant protection against a potential medical
malpractice (or battery) claim somewhere down the line for having
performed the surgery.296 In most instances, parental consent
doctrines effectively preclude judicial review because parents are
allowed wide latitude in making decisions about the appropriate
medical treatments for their children.297 In the context of sex
assignment surgery, however, this deference may not be warranted.
Like medical protocols, parental decision-making in this context
is heavily influenced by cultural and legal intolerance. 298 This often
manifests itself in the form of anxiety about raising a child whose
body looks different from cultural expectations.299 But parents also
feel a sense of urgency to determine the sex of their newborn child for
a whole host of social and legal reasons, including the need to identify
the sexual identity of the child in binary terms on legal documents.300
Legal narratives, then, shape medical decision-making about sex
assignment surgery on children and the related issue of classification
into binary categories, on both ends of the analysis. On the one end,
doctors develop medical protocols in response to perceived cultural
and legal demands for binary sexual identity.3"1 On other end, doctors
are provided with protection from liability for the surgeries and other
treatments that they employ to perfect a binary classification on
bodies that do not naturally comply. 32 In both instances, law
"collaborates" with scientific and other cultural discourses to help
make binary sexual identity appear more "natural" than it really is.303
reassignment surgeries on children. See Beh & Diamond, David Reimer's Legacy, supra
note 232, at 9.
296. See Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Medical Practitioner's Liability for Treatment
Given Child Without Parent's Consent, 67 A.L.R. 4th 511, § 2(a) (1989).
297. See id.
298. See Beh & Diamond, David Reimer's Legacy, supra note 232, at 10.
299. See id. at 5-7.
300. See id. at 15-16 (noting the social desire to announce the birth of a boy or a girl);
Dean Spade, Documenting Gender, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 731, 735 (2008) (noting the demands
of legal documents).
301. See, e.g., Beh & Diamond, David Reimer's Legacy, supra note 232, at 10 (noting
that medical science mirrors western society more generally in assuming that binary sexual
identity is normal, while deviations from it are abnormal).
302. See supra note 224-33 and accompanying text.
303. LEVIT, supra note 53, at 3.
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2. How Legal Narratives Shape Other Medical Decisions Related to
Sexual Identity
Another example of how legal narratives influence how we view
the "nature" of binary sexual identity can be found in the response of
the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") to the breast implant
litigation. After several years of litigation, the FDA called for a
moratorium on the implantation of silicone gel implants because of
questions about the implants' safety.3" The FDA's call for a
moratorium, however, applied only to the use of implants for purely
cosmetic purposes.3 °5 The agency decided to keep implants on the
market for purposes of reconstructing breasts lost to mastectomy,
citing the unique physical and psychological need of these
individuals." 6 In other words, the FDA's views on breast implants
tracked the legal narratives of the breast implant litigation, which also
distinguished between purely cosmetic uses of the implants and using
them to replace a natural breast.
From a safety perspective, however, the FDA's decision is
difficult to understand.3 7 If there was a problem with the safety of
silicone implants, then the agency should have pulled silicone
implants from the market for all purposes, especially since
alternatives to silicone implants, such as saline implants and
prostheses, were readily available.3 8 Despite this, however, the FDA
privileged those who sought access to the implants for purposes of
reconstructing a biological breast. It is also clear that one of the key
reasons for continuing to make the silicone implants available for this
limited group of people was that the non-silicone alternatives did not
provide women with breasts that, in the FDA's view, appeared
sufficiently "natural."3 9
As is the case with medical decisions affecting intersex children,
medical and regulatory decisions about breast implants intersected
with cultural and legal narratives to reinforce dominant sexual
identity narratives. In the breast implants context, doctors and other
experts pointed to cultural expectations about the bodily indicators of
304. Malcolm Gladwell, FDA Will Allow Limited Use of Silicone-Gel Breast Implants,
WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 1992, at A2.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. See Bloom, supra note 25, at 102 ("[T]he FDA acknowledged that it had no proof
of the implants' safety.").
308. See Benson Yang, The Breast Implant Controversy: A Prism for Reform, 12 RISK
123, 123-24 (2001).
309. David A. Kessler, The Basis of the FDA's Decision on Breast Implants, 326 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1713, 1714 (1992).
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sexual identity to prescribe silicone implants for individuals who lose
one or more breasts to mastectomy or who are diagnosed with
"micromastia" (flat-chestedness).31 ° The law, in turn, provided legal
protection to these "medical" judgments through professional custom
standards, which precluded liability so long as the surgical
recommendations and procedures were consistent with the customary
practices of other physicians.3"'
3. The Role of Experts in Tort Litigation
Medical decisions about sex assignment surgery on children and
breast implantation practices provide two examples of how law and
science collaborate to emphasize the binary "nature" of sexual
identity. In both instances, tort litigation provided some protection to
customary medical practices, even when they seemed to rest more on
cultural assumptions than scientific principles. Part of the reason for
this deference has to do with the role of experts in tort litigation.
Most tort cases, particularly those involving products liability or
medical malpractice claims, cannot be litigated successfully without
expert testimony.312
Under the federally-based Daubert test for the admission of
expert testimony,313 and under many similar state-based standards for
expert testimony,3 14 an expert's testimony must comply with a set of
310. Id.
311. KEETON ET AL., supra note 224, § 32, at 189.
312. Id.; see also Wall v. Noble, 705 S.W.2d 727, 730-31 (Tex. App. 1986) (finding that
the breach of standard of care was sufficiently established through testimony of an expert
witness supporting the jury verdict); Versteeg v. Mowery, 435 P.2d 540, 542-43 (Wash.
1967) (holding that the jury may determine the standard of care necessary in a medical
malpractice case based on expert testimony).
313. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-95 (1993); see also 2
DOBBS, supra note 12, § 360, at 993 (noting that Daubert has made it more difficult for
some plaintiffs to get expert testimony admitted on scientific matters in federal trials).
314. Although Daubert is a federal standard, many states have adopted Daubert or
some variation of Daubert for use in state courts. See, e.g., State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386, 386
(Alaska 1999); State v. Porter, 698 A.2d 739, 739 (Conn. 1997); Bell Sports, Inc. v.
Yarusso, 759 A.2d 582, 588 (Del. 2000); Mitchell v. Kentucky, 908 S.W.2d 100, 101 (Ky.
1995); State v. Ledet, 00-1103, p. 17 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/30/01); 792 So. 2d. 160, 161; State v.
McDonald, 1998 ME 212, 7, 718 A.2d 195, 198; State v. Moore, 885 P.2d 457, 470 (Mont.
1994); Dow Chem. Co. v. Mahlum, Inc., 970 P.2d 98, 107-08 (Nev. 1999); State v.
Anderson, 881 P.2d 29, 36 (N.M. 1994); State v. Goode, 341 N.C. 514, 527, 461 S.E.2d 631,
639 (1995); Miller v. Bike Athletic Co., 687 N.E.2d 735, 740 (Ohio 1998); State v.
Ouattrocchi, 681 A.2d 879, 884 n.2 (R.I. 1996); State v. Hofer, 512 N.W.2d 482, 494 (S.D.
1994); McDaniel v. CSX Transp., Inc., 955 S.W.2d 257, 262 (Tenn. 1997); E.I. du Pont
Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 554 (Tex. 1995); State v. Brooks, 643 A.2d
226, 229 (Vt. 1993); Wilt v. Buracker, 443 S.E.2d 196, 196 (W. Va. 1993); Bunting v.
Jamieson, 984 P.2d 467, 467 (Wyo. 1999).
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guidelines which purport to guarantee the validity of the scientific
research which gives rise to the medical practices.31 One of the key
indicators of validity is publication in a peer review journal.316
Peer review journals, however, often reflect the biases of the
times. Again, the case of sex assignment surgery on children provides
a powerful illustration of this point. The key research underlying the
medical protocols authorizing such surgeries was published in peer
review journals some time ago and focused on an allegedly successful
conversion of a male infant to a female, following a traumatic injury
to the child's genitals.317 The research was widely reported as an
unequivocal "success" in both critically acclaimed articles published
in peer review journals and highly publicized media accounts that
concealed the child's name.31 Several years later, however, the
individual exposed the surgeries as a tragic failure in a best-selling
memoir.31 9
Although the research noted above has now been widely
criticized, doctors in the United States continue to rely on medical
protocols citing this research to perform sex change operations on
infants and children.3"' This is largely because there is still a perceived
need to identify the child as either male or female and surgery is one
means of perfecting the categorization.32' Moreover, since the
research supporting these practices was published in a peer review
315. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 580.
316. Id. at 592-93; see also Susan Haack, Peer Review and Publication: Lessons for
Lawyers, 36 STETSON L. REV. 789, 790-91 (2007) (describing the role of peer review in
Daubert). Not everyone agrees with an interpretation of Daubert that places such
emphasis on peer review publications. See generally Paul C. Gianelli, Daubert "Factors,"
CRIM. JUST., Winter 2009, at 42 (discussing the Daubert factors and the limitations of peer
review). Under Daubert, other key factors for consideration in determining evidentiary
reliability include whether the theory or technique has been tested, the known or potential
rate of error, the standards controlling the operation of the technique, and "general
acceptance." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94 (internal quotation marks omitted).
317. See John Money, Ablatio Penis: Normal Male Infant Sex-Reassigned as a Girl, 4
ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 65, 65-71 (1975).
318. See COLAPINTO, supra note 32, at xiii, 68; see also Money, supra note 317, at 65-
71 (discussing David Reimer's sex reassignment surgery).
319. COLAPINTO, supra note 32, at xiv.
320. See Beh & Diamond, David Reimer's Legacy, supra note 232, at 17; Chi et al.,
supra note 205, at e83; Lee et al., supra note 84, at e491-92 (listing surgery on infants as
part of the American Academy of Pediatrics' policy on the "management" of intersex
conditions).
321. See Beh & Diamond, David Reimer's Legacy, supra note 232, at 16; see also Lee et
al., supra note 84, at e491-92 (noting that the child's sex is one of the first questions asked
and describing surgical techniques for sex assignment in newborns).
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journal, it still qualifies under the Daubert standard for evidentiary
reliability and is therefore still admissible in legal proceedings.322
Until relatively recently, it would have been very difficult to even
challenge such testimony. This is because, in the early years following
initial publication of the research, critics who questioned whether the
surgery was truly a success were unable to get published in peer
review journals.3 23 As a practical matter this means that, until
relatively recently, no expert could qualify in medical malpractice or
other litigation to challenge expert testimony that was based on the
initial research, at least in those jurisdictions following Daubert.
The fact that, until recently, medical texts described the birth of a
child with ambiguous genitalia as a "social emergency 3 24 is indicative
of the extent to which medical experts are cognizant that the situation
poses more of a cultural, rather than medical, dilemma. The situation
was said to constitute a "social emergency" because it revealed a gap
between the cultural demand that sexual identity be binary and the
reality of human experience. Although ambiguous genitalia usually
pose no threat to the physical health of the child, surgical
reconstruction and other treatments are typically employed almost
immediately to literally construct binary sexual difference onto bodies
that do not comply on their own. With this move, doctors expose their
own roles in the construction of sexual identity by, among other
things, delineating and reconstructing bodies to fit within normative
expectations.
By deferring to these experts and the particular cultural
narratives about sexual identity that they employ, tort law helps to
maintain certain cultural beliefs about sex and gender, even when
those beliefs are at odds with physical experience. In doing so, the law
goes beyond constraining certain types of behavior and provides
important legitimacy for particular, cultural understandings about
what it means, physically, to have a sexual identity. Put differently, by
privileging narratives that emphasize "natural" and binary sexual
322. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-95 (1993). A court may
still consider criticism of these views and allow the jury to reach a conclusion about which
expert is more persuasive. Id. at 596 (noting that cross-examination, presentation of
contrary evidence, and jury instructions may still be utilized to attack testimony that is
admissible under a Daubert analysis).
323. COLAPINTO, supra note 32, at 210-11 (describing how Milton Diamond's early
research on gender reassignment was rejected by the New England Journal of Medicine).
324. See Am. Acad. Pediatrics, supra note 204, at 138.
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difference, tort litigation helps to constitute the categories of binary
difference.325
IV. TORT LITIGATION CAN AND SHOULD BE MORE REAL ABOUT
SEXUAL IDENTITY BY ALLOWING SPACE FOR COMPETING SEXUAL
IDENTITY NARRATIVES
Tort litigation is facilitating the political hegemony of particular
narratives of sexual identity which emphasize that sexual identity is
largely immutable and naturally binary. To be "real" for purposes of
sexual identity in tort litigation is to have a body which is "naturally"
male or female and remains fixed in its designated identity. In real
life, however, people experience sexual identity in far more complex
ways. As a practical matter, this means that tort litigation is helping to
maintain and produce norms and expectations that do not adequately
reflect or acknowledge the diversity of human experience with sexual
identity.
Tort litigation need not play this role. Instead, tort litigation can
and should be more real about sexual identity by allowing more space
for competing narratives. Tort litigation is, admittedly, a particularly
challenging arena to make space for competing sexual identity
narratives because, as compared to other areas of the law (such as
civil rights litigation), individual rights have always come second to
community norms in tort litigation.3 26 That said, tort litigation also has
a strong tradition of evolving in response to changing community
values.327
This Part argues that by drawing on this tradition and, in
particular, on the pragmatic realism of Oliver Wendell Holmes,328 tort
325. See HUNT, supra note 248, at 3 (describing how law plays a role in constituting
social practices).
326. See Patrick J. Kelley, Who Decides? Community Safety Conventions at the Heart
of Tort Liability, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 315, 379-90 (1990).
327. VINCENT R. JOHNSON & ALAN GUNN, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 3 (2d
ed. 1999) (describing how the rules of tort law have evolved in response to changing
societal needs); see also Peter H. Schuck, Introduction: The Context of the Controversy in
TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: COMPETITION, INNOVATION, AND CONSUMER
WELFARE 17, 18 (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991) ("Tort liability, more than most areas of law,
mirrors the economic, technological, ideological, and moral conditions that prevail in
society at any given time."); Martha Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage: The
Migration from Civil Rights to Tort Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2115, 2119-24 (2007)
(describing the migration of the community values recognized in civil rights law to tort
law).
328. See Catharine Wells Hantzis, Legal Innovation Within the Wider Intellectual
Tradition: The Pragmatism of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 541, 556-57
(1988). See generally John T. Valauri, Peirce and Holmes, in PEIRCE AND LAW: ISSUES IN
PRAGMATISM, LEGAL REALISM, AND SEMIOTICS, 187, 187-99 (Roberta Kevelson ed.,
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litigation can become more real about sexual identity by paying
greater attention to lived experiences with sexual identity. Pragmatic
realism and Holmes's jurisprudence, in particular, are uniquely well-
suited for this project because of the emphasis these theories place on
the importance of lived experience in legal decision-making.329 As
Holmes wrote famously, "The life of the law has not been logic: it has
been experience."330
But pragmatic realism is also an appropriate tool for rethinking
our approach to sexual identity issues in tort litigation because of its
commitment to interrogating categories which purport to represent
the "real." '331 For Holmes, and other pragmatists during his time,
reality could not be determined solely by observation.332 Instead, they
claimed that what we understand to be "real" is, in fact, a product of
both the physical world and how your mind sees it.333 Put differently,
Holmes and his pragmatist contemporaries maintained that you
cannot separate what you see from what prior "cognitions" have led
you to expect to see.334 As a result, Holmes, like other pragmatists
and realists who followed him, argued against judicial decision-
making which relied too much on "admitted axioms."335
In more contemporary versions of pragmatism, this commitment
has been understood in terms of "antifoundationlism" or a refusal to
justify legal decisions on the basis of certain widely accepted
foundational beliefs.336 This view of reality shares many things in
common with postmodern conceptions of the "real." '337 But Holmes
and other early pragmatists differed from postmodernists in one
important respect: most postmodernists reject any notion of objective
1991) [hereinafter PEIRCE AND LAW] (discussing Holmes's and Peirce's early
contributions to pragmatism). Although he rejected the label himself, Holmes is widely
viewed as a pragmatist. He is also viewed as one of the earliest forerunners of "realism."
See Thomas C. Grey, Modern American Thought, 106 YALE L. J. 493, 496-500 (1996).
329. Holmes, supra note 41, at 460-61.
330. HOLMES, supra note 42, at 1.




335. Holmes, supra note 41, at 460-61: see also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76
(1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("General propositions do not decide concrete cases.").
336. Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76
TEX. L. REV. 267, 305 (1997).
337. See, e.g., Robert W. Benson, Peirce and Critical Legal Studies, in PEIRCE AND
LAW, supra note 328, at 15, 17. Some of pragmatism's claims also resonate closely with the
performativity related claims of contemporary queer theory. See id. at 49 ("[T]he meaning
of a physical object is given by the complete specification of its behavior.").
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or pre-political realities.338 The early pragmatists, in contrast, did
believe in an objective reality but were skeptical about our capacity to
transcend our own consciousness enough to grasp it.339
This distinction matters for purposes of how courts might
approach sexual identity in tort litigation because a Holmesian
version of pragmatic realism, unlike postmodernism or contemporary
versions of pragmatism, allows us to both acknowledge the possibility
of "realness" and interrogate dominant conceptions of what it means
to be "real" at the same time.340 In other words, Holmes's beliefs
about the nature of reality (and the impossibility of ever fully
grasping reality) suggest the need for a certain humility in judicial
decision-making.341  Good legal practices might advance our
understanding of the "real" but no individual, not even a judge, has
an absolute handle on the truth.
Holmes also emphasized that a judge should be attentive to the
ways in which law itself plays a role in constructing how we (and
judges, in particular) view the world.342 Put differently, Holmes
recognized what Part III of this Article argued in the context of
sexual identity in tort litigation: that legal practices help to constitute
our understanding of reality.3 43 For all of these reasons, Holmes's
legal philosophy has much to teach us about how to approach sexual
identity in tort litigation.
A. Pragmatic Realism Makes Space for Competing Sexual Identity
Narratives
This sub-Part argues that Holmesian pragmatism suggests three
important principles that can be applied to questions about the
338. Stephen M. Feldman, Diagnosing Power: Postmodernism in Legal Scholarship and
Judicial Practice (With an Emphasis on the Teague Rule Against New Rules in Habeas
Corpus Cases), 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1046, 1047 (1994) ("Postmodernism rejects the very
possibility of essences, cores or foundations.").
339. Catharine Pierce Wells, Old-Fashioned Postmodernism and the Legal Theories of
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 63 BROOK. L. REV. 59,71 (1997).
340. See id.
341. See id. at 84. It is difficult to speak of "humility" in decision-making with respect
to Holmes without acknowledging some of his more arrogant opinions, including Buck v.
Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), in which he ruled in favor of a state sterilization law with the
infamous line, "three generations of imbeciles are enough." Buck, 274 U.S. at 207.
342. Wells, supra note 339, at 73 ("[Holmes's view was that] a judge's particular
viewpoint is itself constructed from the concepts of the common law and heavily
influenced by the judge's own immersion in legal culture.").
343. See Holmes, supra note 41, at 461. Holmes's famous declaration that law is what
the courts "do in fact" captures this sentiment well. Id. Peirce's framing states it more
directly: "we are active participants in 'the creation of the universe.' " Richard J.
Bernstein, The Lure of the Ideal, in PEIRCE AND LAW, supra note 328, at 29, 42.
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"realness" of sexual identity in tort litigation: (1) the importance of
interrogating categories of any kind, even those that seem to be
"real"; (2) the value of human experience in understanding what is
"real"; and (3) the benefits of hearing a plurality of perspectives on
what constitutes "realness., 34  Applying these principles in the
context of sexual identity issues in tort litigation yields a more flexible
jurisprudence, which is skeptical about categories for ordering sexual
identity and looks carefully at how well they fit with the diverse array
of human experiences. In other words, Holmesian pragmatism allows
us to acknowledge the close relationship between tort law and
cultural values, while simultaneously providing us with the tools to
interrogate that relationship.
1. The Importance of Interrogating Categories
Holmes maintained that "[n]o concrete proposition is self-
evident." '345 Because of this, we cannot take categories for granted.346
Instead, we must evaluate the historical conditions which created the
categories and evaluate how well the categories meet with real world
experience.347 If experience defies categorization, then the categories
are problematic and need to be refined. 348 Thus, categories, viewed
properly, are essentially hypotheses that must continue to be
evaluated and refined in light of human experience. Pragmatic
realism, then, calls for utilizing categories in a contingent way.
Applying this insight to the question of sexual identity in tort
litigation, pragmatic realism teaches us to be more attentive (and
responsive) to evidence which suggests that the categories are
problematic. When real world experience suggests that the categories
of sexual identity are problematic, pragmatic realism tells us that we
must attempt to refine the categories to account for the ways in which
human experience is currently at odds with the categorical
344. These three categories represent the author's own interpretation of how Holmes's
(and other pragmatists of his time) views might be employed in the context of sexual
identity.
345. Holmes, supra note 41, at 466.
346. See Haack, supra note 41, at 88. Both Peirce and Holmes especially disfavored
categories which claimed sharp distinctions. See id. (quoting Rideout v. Knox, 19 N.E. 390,
392 (Mass. 1889) and citing 2 CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, COLLECTED PAPERS ch.2,
§§ 102-03 (Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss & Arthur Burks eds., Harvard Univ. Press
1960) (1892)).
347. See Haack, supra note 41, at 82-83; see also Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic
Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 453-54 (1930) (stating that a
realistic approach to a new problem requires considering if the existing set of concepts
accurately categorizes data in a manner that advances a true solution).
348. See Haack, supra note 41, at 82-83; Llewellyn, supra note 347, at 453-54.
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definitions.349 When confronted with evidence that sexual identity is
not always immutable or binary, for example, judges should refine the
categories of sexual identity to allow for more fluidity.
The Kansas ruling in the Gardiner cases35° provides an example
of how a court might take this approach in practice.351 The case
involved a male-to-female transsexual who, after sex reassignment
surgery, married a biological male.352 After her husband died, her
husband's son from another marriage sought to disinherit her from
her husband's estate on the ground that the marriage was invalid
because both parties had been born "male." '353 Although the case did
not involve a tort, the court's approach provides a model for how
courts addressing similar questions about sexual identity in tort
litigation might analyze the issues.
In attempting to adjudicate the case, the Kansas Court of
Appeals noted the difficulty in determining what constitutes a male or
female and considered an array of factors employed by medical
experts, including appearance of the genitalia and chromosomes.354
Ultimately, however, the court concluded that it could not rely
on only one factor because the question of sexual identity was "far
more complex" than could be captured with a single factor.355 The
court also noted that it might make more sense to abandon an
approach that relies on a binary conception of sexual identity.356
The court's ruling was ultimately reversed by the Kansas
Supreme Court.357 Nevertheless, it provides a good example of how
pragmatism might help us to be more real about sexual identity.
Consistent with pragmatist teachings about the importance of
interrogating categories, the Kansas Court of Appeals compared real
world experience with the binary categories of sexual identity and
found them lacking.358 It then attempted to refine those categories,
with indicators that allowed for more fluidity in the classifications of
binary sexual identity and ultimately raised questions about the utility
349. See Haack, supra note 41, at 82-83; Llewellyn, supra note 347, at 453-54.
350. In re Estate of Gardiner (Gardiner I), 22 P.3d 1086, 1091 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001),
rev'd 42 P.3d 120, 135 (Kan. 2002) (Gardiner II). For further discussion of this case, see
supra notes 258-62 and accompanying text.
351. See Gardiner I, 22 P.3d at 1091.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 1090.
354. Id. at 1094.
355. Id. at 1110.
356. Id. (quoting Greenberg, Defining Male and Female, supra note 40, at 278-79).
357. In re Gardiner (Gardiner II), 42 P.3d 120, 135 (Kan. 2002).
358. Gardiner 1, 22 P.3d at 1094.
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of any sort of attempt to maintain such sharp categorical distinctions
along binary lines.359
In the Kansas case, the court of appeals interrogated the
categories for evidence of how well they fit with human experience.
But a pragmatic approach to sexual identity might do even more. For
pragmatists, categories should be interrogated carefully because of
the inherent difficulty in separating what you think you see from what
your mind has trained you to see.36° One way to try to sort out what is
"real" from what is not is to compare the categories against evidence
of human experience.36' Another way to interrogate the categories is
to examine their underlying assumptions in light of their particular
historical, political, and social contexts. 362
In conducting this type of analysis, our current understanding of
sexual identity reveals an important fact. While contemporary
accounts of sexual identity rely heavily on scientific narratives that
categorize sexual identity along binary lines, science did not always
categorize sexual identity in this way.363 Instead, in the medieval era,
scientists and doctors in the Western world spoke of sexual identity in
terms of one sex, rather than two.3" And, at other points in history,
Western scientists viewed sex along a continuum. 65 Moreover,
scientific beliefs about the key indicators of binary sexual difference
have also undergone change over time. In the pre-modern era, for
example, Aristotle maintained that sex could be determined by "the
359. Id. at 1110.
360. See Haack, supra note 41, at 82-83; Llewellyn, supra note 347, at 453-54.
361. See Haack, supra note 41, at 82-83; Llewellyn, supra note 347, at 453-54.
362. See HOLMES, supra note 42, at 1. Thus, Holmes placed particular emphasis on
understanding "[t]he felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political
theories.... even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men" as influential
in the law. Id.
363. See THOMAS LAQUEUR, MAKING SEX: BODY AND GENDER FROM THE GREEKS
TO FREUD 11 (1990). Laqueur argues, for example, that the conceptualization of sex as
binary is a relatively recent cultural phenomenon that took place in the late seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries. Id. This reinterpretation of bodies took place in tandem with
other political and cultural developments, including the rise of evangelical religion,
Lockean ideas of marriage as a contract, and post-revolutionary feminism, all of which led
to greater emphasis on binary sexual differentiation. Id. Others present a somewhat more
complex historical view of the development of contemporary understandings of binary
sexual difference while still acknowledging the important role of culture in shaping these
views. See generally JOAN CADDEN, MEANINGS OF SEX DIFFERENCE IN THE MIDDLE
AGES: MEDICINE, SCIENCE, AND CULTURE (1993) (describing the historical origins of
medieval views on sex differences and attempting to integrate the era's scientific and
medical understandings with its cultural notions of sex).
364. LAQUEUR, supra note 363, at 134.
365. Id. at 135-36.
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heat of the heart. ' 366 It was not until the nineteenth century that
reproductive capacity and the appearance of genitalia became the
primary means of sexual designation.367 In other words, when we
interrogate the categories of binary sexual identity, we can see how
contemporary understandings of sexual identity, and the binary
categories themselves, are not "real" in the sense of firm,
unchangeable concepts which relate to some objective "reality"
outside of culture. Instead, they are products of particular historical
and cultural contexts.368
2. The Value of Human Experience
Pragmatism emphasizes "the importance of experience in
determining meaning. 3 69 This view stems in part from a suspicion of
categories.370 Holmes and other pragmatists believed strongly that, to
understand the world, we cannot detach from it by using abstractions,
like categorical assumptions.37' Instead, we must evaluate the
abstractions we employ in light of human experience.372
In the sexual identity context, an emphasis on experience might
prompt us to take a different approach in cases involving doubts
about sexual identity. Instead of relying solely on experts, for
example, we might consider accepting the probative value of
subjective experience. Thus, in cases involving transsexuals and
intersex individuals, the subjective experience of sexual identity of the
individuals involved would have relevance for the case.
An emphasis on experience in the context of sexual identity
might also prompt us to consider testimony from members of the
community about their own experiences, as they relate to the case. In
determining whether a post-operative transsexual qualifies as a
spouse for purposes of a wrongful death claim, for example,
366. FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 40, at 33.
367. Id. at 36-37.
368. Suzanne J. Kessler & Wendy McKenna, Toward a Theory of Gender, in THE
TRANSGENDER STUDIES READER, supra note 8, at 165,176.
369. Valauri, supra note 328, at 188. Pragmatism also emphasizes the role that
categories play in structuring meaning. Id.
370. Id. at 195 (noting that, for Holmes, rules or categorical distinctions in the law
should be viewed as constructs from practical experience, rather than deductions from
general propositions).
371. See Haack, supra note 41, at 102. Peirce was particularly critical of the Cartesian
notion of intuitive certainty and described himself as "ready to dump the whole cartload of
his beliefs the moment experience is against them." Id. (quoting 1 CHARLES SANDERS
PEIRCE, COLLECTED PAPERS ch. 1, § 5 (Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss & Arthur Burks
eds., Harvard Univ. Press 1960) (1892)).
372. See Valauri, supra note 328, at 191-97.
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pragmatism suggests that we would be interested in hearing testimony
on whether others in the community viewed them as married.
This was, in fact, the approach of the court in the early Hall
case.373 Following the community's standards for sex identification,
this court indicated that "sex had two possible determinants. One was
physical: the nature of one's genitalia. The other was cultural: the
character of one's knowledge and one's manner of behaving.1374
Because of this, the court considered the testimony of members of the
community and how they perceived Hall to be relevant in
determining Hall's sexual identity.375
Similarly, a pragmatic approach might also place more value on
obtaining opinions based on actual experience with sexual identity in
cases involving sex assignment or reassignment surgery. In cases
involving children, for example, the court might hear evidence about
the experiences of intersex adults, both those who have undergone
surgery and those who have not. Such experiential evidence seems
particularly important to obtain in cases, like those involving surgery
on intersex children, where the decision-makers may not be able to
fairly evaluate the relative costs and benefits.376 This is because it is
not intuitive for most individuals to imagine living outside a binary
sex classification.
As critical disability scholars have emphasized, concepts of what
constitutes physical normality are socially constructed.3 77 As a
practical matter this means that most parents and physicians are
deeply influenced by dominant cultural norms and expectations in
determining the best interests of the child. Under these
circumstances, what seems "normal" to a non-affected parent may
not seem "normal" to the affected child and vice versa.378
373. VIRGINIA COLONIAL MINUTES, supra note 21, at 194-95.
374. Katrina C. Rose, A History of Gender Variance in Pre-2Oth Century Anglo-
American Law, 14 TEX J. WOMEN & L. 77, 96 (2004) (quoting MARY BETH NORTON,
FOUNDING MOTHERS & FATHERS: GENDERED POWER AND THE FORMING OF
AMERICAN SOCIETY 194-95 (1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
375. See VIRGINIA COLONIAL MINUTES, supra note 21, at 194-95.
376. See Tamar-Mattis, Exceptions to the Rule, supra note 232, at 86-89. Another
problem is that the long-term costs and benefits are not clear. See generally Beh &
Diamond, David Reimer's Legacy, supra note 232 (arguing that the benefits of infant
surgery do not outweigh the risks). But cf Aliabadi, supra note 233, at 449-50 (arguing
that the cultural benefits of the surgeries are a clear benefit to the child).
377. See Paul Miller, Toward Truly Informed Decisions About Appearance-
Normalizing Surgeries, in SURGICALLY SHAPING CHILDREN: TECHNOLOGY, ETHICS,
AND THE PURSUIT OF NORMALITY 211, 219 (Erik Parens ed., 2006); see also Theresa
Glennon, Race, Education, and the Construction of a Disabled Class, 1995 WIS. L. REV.
1237, 1304-05 (describing how cultural norms construct notions of disability).
378. Miller, supra note 377, at 219-21.
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Evidence of this can be seen in the different approaches of
affected and non-affected parents in allowing "normalizing"
treatments on their affected children. Many adults with physical
differences oppose "normalizing" treatments for children, such as
limb-lengthening surgeries and cochlear implants.3"9 This is because,
from the perspective of the "affected" adult, there is nothing that
needs "fixing."380 Non-affected parents, in contrast, are more likely to
choose the treatments for their affected children.38' Because it is likely
that parents' understanding of what is best for their child is shaped by
their own experiences, there is good reason to question whether the
experiences of doctors and parents who do not have the same
physical difference are sufficient to allow a court to issue an order
permitting normalizing surgeries, such as sex assignment (or
reassignment) surgery on children.382
A similar principle would apply in cases involving product
liability claims. In these cases, pragmatism would place some value on
hearing testimony about the value of sexual identity amplification
devices in real-life experience. To determine whether breast implant
recipients should be treated differently on the basis of whether they
underwent implantation for purposes of replacing a biological breast,
for example, the court might hear testimony from different implant
recipients on whether this difference caused them to experience the
devices differently. A pragmatic approach might also value evidence
on the social and economic benefits that accompany the successful
performance of binary sexual identity.
3. The Benefits of Hearing a Plurality of Perspectives
Holmes has been described as a pragmatic pluralist because of
his dedication to hearing a variety of viewpoints. 383 Holmes's
commitment to hearing different voices on an issue stemmed, in large
part, from his belief that one's perspective with regard to a particular
case colored his or her view of it.3' Holmes especially valued the
voices of legal "outsiders," and saw them as critical to advancing his
379. Id. at 216.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. See Beh & Diamond, David Reimer's Legacy, supra note 232, at 25-26. Indeed, it
is precisely these types of concerns that prompted the Constitutional Court of Colombia to
hold that sex assignment and reassignment surgeries on children must be delayed until the
children themselves are old enough to understand the costs and benefits of the treatments
and give meaningful consent. See Haas, supra note 210, at 49-54.
383. Wells, supra note 339, at 78-79.
384. Id.
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own understanding.385 Applying these insights to sexual identity
issues, Holmes's pragmatism teaches the importance of hearing from
multiple perspectives on the issues raised.386 And, perhaps, more
importantly, pragmatism argues for giving more voice to those whose
views are not privileged by those in power.387
In the Hall case, the views of members of the community and
Hall's own testimony were considered highly relevant in determining
Hall's sexual identity.388 Since that time, science and courts have come
to rely more on biologically verifiable characteristics of sexual
identity.389 As a result, physicians and scientists have displaced
members of the community (and even judges) as the "primary
arbiters" of sexual designation.3 Pragmatism emphasizes the
relevance of all of these voices. Especially in light of the culturally
constructed aspects of sexual identity, there is no apparent need to
privilege expert opinions above others; they should be given the same
weight as other experiences.
In some areas of tort law, there are signs that the law is already
moving in this direction. The Restatement (Third) of Torts, for
example, now permits recovery in emotional distress cases, for a
victim's "family" members, even if they are not biologically or legally
related to the victim.' In taking this approach, the Restatement
implicitly acknowledges that people experience "family" differently
and that tort law should allow for this diversity in its mechanisms for
recovery. Although this change is limited to cases involving bystander
claims for emotional distress,392 a similar approach could be taken in
wrongful death cases, which would allow for recovery by individuals
who are not legally married or permitted to marry.3 93
More fundamentally, the change in how tort law addresses
bystander recovery in emotional distress cases illustrates how
pragmatism can make space for competing conceptions of "realness"
more broadly, while continuing to utilize contested legal categories
385. Id. Many readers may find this difficult to square with Holmes's infamous
language in Buck v. Bell that "three generations of imbeciles is enough." Buck v. Bell, 274
U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
386. See Wells, supra note 339, at 70-72.
387. See id. at 78-79.
388. VIRGINIA COLONIAL MINUTES, supra note 21, at 194-95.
389. FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 40, at 40.
390. Id.
391. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM, § 47 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 5,2007).
392. See id.
393. I am indebted to an external reviewer for bringing this point to my attention.
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for purposes of recovery. In this case, the contested legal category is
that of "real" family members. By continuing to interrogate that
category in light of changing human experience, tort law, through the
Restatement, was able to make space for a broader array of
perspectives about what "real" family means. To be sure, the
resulting reconstruction of the category still excludes many
relationships that many would consider to be indicative of "real"
family.394 Pragmatism calls for continuing to interrogate and
reconstruct the category, however, while continuing to listen to a
plurality of perspectives on what "realness" means in this and other
contexts.
In sum, pragmatism calls for a "bottom-up" rather than "top-
down" approach to sexual identity in litigation, which is constantly re-
calibrating, in response to the realities of human experience, as
interpreted by a variety of viewpoints. With this approach, courts can
become more real about sexual identity by making space for greater
attention to lived experiences with sexual identity. Tort litigation
need not adopt all of the narratives that such an approach might
reveal. It should, however, make space for them to be articulated.
B. Why Being Real About Sexual Identity Does Not Mean Taking
Sexual Identity out of Tort Law
At the moment, tort litigation does not allow for the possibility
that sexual identity can be understood in anything other than binary
terms. This is true even when courts are confronted with compelling
evidence that undermines a binary classification. This Article argues
that the appropriate response to this state of affairs is to employ a
more pragmatic jurisprudence which makes more space for
competing narratives of sexual difference. One response to this
proposal might be to argue that it would be better to simply take
sexual identity completely out of the picture of tort litigation.
Doing so would arguably have the effect of focusing more on the
details of the particular claim at issue. By removing sexual identity
from the analysis, for example, a court might focus more on the
quality of the relationship of the person seeking to bring a wrongful
394. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 391, § 47 cmt. e. For example,
the Restatement Third does not allow recovery for individuals who do not live in the same
household, even though many people may consider some people who do not live in the
same household to be "real" family. See id. For further discussion of cultural perspectives
on family relationships, see generally C. Quince Hopkins, Variety in U.S. Kinship
Practices, Substantive Due Process Analysis and the Right to Marry, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 665
(2004).
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death claim on someone else's behalf.3 95 Similarly, rather than
considering the sexual identity of an individual seeking or using
prosthetic devices or other products to construct or amplify sex, a jury
might be instructed to ignore this aspect of the case and focus solely
on whether the product failed. And, in cases involving surgery on
infants, the analysis could focus on medical need, rather than
attempting to determine the sexual identity of the child before or
after surgery.
The problem with this response is that it ignores the significance
of sex in our culture and the many social and economic benefits it
bestows. It also ignores that the injuries in these cases are "sexed"
injuries, in that much of the pain and suffering associated with the
failure of the product, a botched surgery, or even a lost spouse, stems
from injuries that have to do with identifying (or seeking to identify)
within the binary sexual identity regime. In short, the failure of sex
performance has real costs and the tort system should not ignore
these real-life experiences.
Tort litigation exposes the fact that the question of binary sexual
identity is a true "Catch-22." On the one hand, the categories of
sexual identity do not completely comport with lived experience. On
the other hand, it is difficult to imagine a meaningful identity without
the binary categories.39 6 Under these circumstances, it makes more
sense for tort law to consider more narratives of sexual difference
while recognizing the powerful role that sexual identity categories
currently play, than to pretend in the law or elsewhere that the
categories do not exist. Ultimately, the question is not whether we
can get rid of binary sexual identity, but rather which cultural
narratives about sexual identity become hegemonic and why.
CONCLUSION
This Article examines the role of tort law in maintaining
categories of sex and gender. It argues broadly that tort law helps to
construct the culture of which it is a part.397 More radically, it posits
395. This seems to be the approach, for example, that is taken by the Restatement Third
on bystander recovery for emotional distress. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS,
supra note 391, § 47, cmt e.
396. See JUDITH BUTLER, UNDOING GENDER 8 (2004) ("In the same way that a life
for which no categories of recognition exist is not a livable life, so a life for which those
categories constitute unlivable constraint is not an acceptable option."); see also Valauri,
supra note 328, at 195 ("Both Peirce and Holmes insisted on the importance and necessity,
but not the sufficiency, of [general propositions] for inquiry and adjudication.").
397. Engel & McCann, supra, note 246, at 1.
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that tort law helps to produce and maintain certain cultural beliefs
about sex and gender, even when those beliefs are at odds with
physical experience.398 In this respect, the politics of sexual identity in
tort litigation share much in common with drag balls. Tort litigation,
like drag balls, is deeply influenced by cultural beliefs about what
signifies "real" sexual identity. And, like contestants in drag balls, tort
litigants must attempt to convince a court of the "realness" of their
sexual identity to succeed. Thus, tort law, like drag, reproduces and
enforces dominant cultural norms about what it means to be male or
a female.
Ultimately, however, it is far more problematic for tort law to
play this role than drag balls. This is because, when courts base legal
rulings on invalid assumptions about sexual identity, they provide
political legitimacy for those assumptions in ways that the politically
and culturally marginalized world of the drag balls cannot. Put
differently, what courts say about the "realness" of binary sexual
identity is far more influential in the political realm than any cultural
messaging that takes place in conjunction with drag balls.
Moreover, in contrast to the drag balls, there is little to no
recognition in tort litigation that the "realness" of sexual identity is
contested territory. Instead, tort litigation continues to treat sexual
identity as if it were naturally binary and immutable, even in the face
of significant evidence to the contrary. In doing so, tort law does not
simply play a powerful role in the construction and enforcement of
those norms; it also obfuscates its own role in this important aspect of
sexual identity politics.
Tort law is not unique in the role that it plays in this process.399
Like other legal narratives, tort litigation narratives both reflect and
contribute to broader cultural meanings. Cultural norms about sexual
difference may be particularly important in tort litigation, however,
because of the way in which tort doctrines operate to explicitly draw
upon dominant cultural norms. It is also significant that tort litigation,
more than other areas of the law, is particularly concerned with
physical injury to body.4 °0 As Professor Jain notes, in tort litigation,
the body seems to act as "a material repository of culture."401
398. See JAIN, supra note 249, at 7.
399. See Paisley Currah, Defending Genders: Sex and Gender Non-Conformity in the
Civil Rights Strategies of Sexual Minorities, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1363, 1368 (1997).
400. See Chamallas, supra note 327, at 2144 (describing how civil rights law and tort
law differ, in part, because of tort law's emphasis on physical injury).
401. JAIN, supra note 249, at 6.
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Pragmatic realism acknowledges this close relationship between
tort law and culture, even as it makes space for challenging cultural
assumptions about what is "real" about sexual identity. To be real,
pragmatic realism teaches us, is to recognize that reality appears
differently to different people and our best shot at grasping it is to
adopt principles and rules of law on a contingent basis, while
continuing to make space for a variety of viewpoints and recalibrating
our rules in response. Thus, we need not abandon cultural, scientific,
and legal narratives about sexual difference. Indeed, pragmatism
teaches us that it would be impossible for us to do so. Rather, the
narratives must continue to be analyzed and adapted in response to
human experience.
In hearing and interpreting these narratives, it is important to
recognize that tort law may never truly free itself from cultural
expectations about sexual identity. But, with a pragmatic approach,
sexual identity categories in the law can and should become more
fluid in its response to those cultural expectations.
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